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Abstract
America’s engagement with the world in the years following 9/11 is often criticized for being
arrogant, conducted in a top-down fashion, and paying too little attention to listening and
creating meaningful human interactions. Since 2009, President Obama has emphasized his belief
in people-to-people contacts and soft power: the idea that a country can achieve what it wants in
world politics by the power of attraction. Public diplomacy programs such as cultural and
educational exchanges are believed to be valuable in creating lifelong friends for the United
States, but there is little empirical evidence of their effectiveness as a foreign policy tool.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the impact of U.S. government-sponsored Fulbright
Student and Fulbright Scholar exchange programs on Estonian participants’ beliefs about the
United States and its role in the world. The empirical part of the study was conducted through
two comprehensive surveys: the first cross-examined 26 Estonians, who participated in the
Fulbright program in 2009-2014, and the second consisted of a control group of 54 Estonians,
who had not taken part in U.S. government-sponsored exchange programs.
The results of the Estonian case study provide some evidence for the effectiveness of the
exchange programs, but suggest that the impact varies, and is strongly shaped by various
historical, cultural, and political factors. The results confirm the notion of the difficulty of
translating soft power into political power, and call for innovative solutions to make the
exchange programs and U.S. public diplomacy more effective, but acknowledge the inherent
value of exchanges in creating global networks and shaping today’s world.

vi

Introduction
“We have failed to listen and failed to persuade. We have not taken the time to understand our
audience, and we have not bothered to help them understand us. We cannot aﬀord such
shortcomings.”
U.S. Department of State, 2003 Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy

Many argue that during the past decades, U.S. policy makers have not fully grasped the
significance of international legitimacy and credibility, and utilized its soft power. President George
W. Bush is often accused of paying almost no attention to international legitimacy and alienating
America’s friends at a time when their support was much needed. There are several reasons to claim
that his administration from the beginning relied too heavily on hard power and underestimated both
the significance and the complexity of building a global alliance. John Ikenberry argues that
America’s unilateral and disrespectful behavior created a world where “the U.S. unbound itself from
its own postwar order and ruled the world by force and fear and searched out new enemies and
threats” (2004, 84). Sharp rise of anti-American sentiment was apparent almost everywhere in the
world, including among America’s closest friends and allies. Mead argues that “[m]any Europeans
were painfully shocked, during the preparations for the American invasion to Iraq, to discover just
how little the United States government at times can care about public opinion among people who do
not vote in American elections,” leaving many people to believe that the upsurge of American power
weakened global democracy (Mead 2005, 63).
Too often, the campaigns that were supposed to send messages of liberation and optimism
ended up sending ones of invasion and defeat (Taverner 2010, 138), and U.S.’ credibility – the very
essence of soft power – in the world was seriously undermined. The struggle against terrorism and
post-9/11 wave of anti-Americanism made it clear that even a country like the United States could
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not afford ignoring public opinion (Wyne 2009, 41; Nye 2011). On one hand, the problems increased
the risk of conflict with America’s greatest foes, and on the other, squandered influence and lost
friends prohibited the U.S. from accomplishing its long-term aspirations. It became clear that military
might was still a critical strategic resource, but the complex problems of the modern world could not
be solved by brute force. The idea of soft power was brought to the forefront of American public
debate. It was clear that it was not going to solve all the problems, but there was a great deal of what
it could help achieve.
In 2009, President Barack Obama and his administration presented a completely different
approach to advancing U.S. interests in the world. The National Security Strategy of 2010, the first
Quadrennial Diplomacy & Development Review (2010) and other strategic documents outlined by
the Obama administration reflect its attempt to redefine its mission and purpose in the world, as well
as demonstrate his awareness of, and comfort with, the realities of the interconnected and culturally
diverse world. The Obama administration has rightfully given diplomacy a much more significant
role than before and rejuvenated U.S. public diplomacy. As Bruce Gregory notes, “Sustained
‘engagement among peoples – not just governments’ is a metanarrative for the Obama
administration’s foreign policy and central to its vision of diplomacy” (2011, 357). The Obama
administration deserves credit for several new public diplomacy initiatives and for transforming the
way the U.S. engages with the world. Nevertheless, across American society, and even across party
lines, there seems to be an agreement on the need to further improve the effectiveness of U.S. public
diplomacy (Lord 2008, 4). This is important particularly in the interconnected and culturally diverse
world, where U.S.’ ability to remain in a world leadership role depends heavily on its ability to
influence foreign populations.
At the same time, in order to be effective, soft power needs to be supplemented by others
forms of power; as the violent and disturbing events in the Middle East, Ukraine, and elsewhere in
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the world once again suggest, U.S. military power remains crucial for global security. The role of
force in world politics is not over, but the nature of power has changed. Nye (2004) argues that
“[f]ifty years ago political struggles were about the ability to control and transmit scarce information.
Today, political struggles are about the creation and destruction of credibility” (8). The term “soft
power” was coined by Nye in the 1990s, and is defined as “an alternative to military power and
economic power that would allow you an indirect way to get what you want” (Nye 1990). Soft power
grows out of culture, out of a country’s domestic values and policies, and out of foreign policy (Nye
2011, 142).
As many other concepts in international relations, the term “soft power” is somewhat
contested. Soft power contains assumptions about how influence works, and proposes that in one
way or another, public opinion – both domestically and internationally – has an impact on a nationstate’s foreign policy objectives (Hayden 2012, 7). Interestingly, Nye argues that soft power is both
an asset to cultivate as well as a tool to use, but maintains that public diplomacy is the main
instrument of soft power (Hayden 2012, 3). Bruce Gregory describes public diplomacy as “an
instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to
understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence thoughts
and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values” (Gregory 2014, 7). At their core, both soft
power and public diplomacy reflect the salience of communication in international relations, and this
communication happens at several different levels. Nye argues that the three dimensions of public
diplomacy are daily communication, strategic communication, and the development of long-lasting
relationships through cultural and educational exchanges (2011, 108-110). Hayden employs a similar
model, arguing that the two principal notions of communication in public diplomacy are information
and relation-building frameworks (2012, 9).

3

In the modern world, both of these methods are important and reflect different levels of
engagement. Daily communications is the most immediate dimension; it seeks to explain different
domestic and foreign policy decisions and maintain the presence of U.S. perspectives in the news
media sphere and the internet. Cultural and educational exchanges are much slower forms of
engagement, but they are also deeper and considered to have the most powerful and long-lasting
influences on people’s attitudes (Nye 2011, 108). In one of his interviews, former Secretary of State
Colin Powell said, “I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future
world leaders who have been educated here,” (quoted in Nye 2004, 44), reinforcing Andrew Stewarts’
idea that “[n]o better press exists than a foreign leader explaining America’s positive virtues” (2006,
15). At their best, public diplomacy programs such as cultural and educational exchanges can give
future political and societal leaders a better idea of what the U.S. stands for and thereby create friends
for the United States. However, this is far from being the only possible outcome of the exchange
programs. For some exchangees, the first-hand experience of living in the United States may, for
different reasons, be a negative one, and this must be taken into account while thinking about the
political benefits from the programs.
Soft power is an indispensable supplement to hard power. Public diplomacy is an instrument
that states use to engage with people and build relationships to advance a country’s interests and
values. Cultural and educational exchange programs remain a key component of public diplomacy
even in the digital age and hold a premise of being agents for profound and long-lasting positive
changes. Cultural relations can build trust between people and many scholars argue that it is
increasingly apparent that cultural understanding is a precondition to solving pressing global
problems, and that having a deep comprehension of America’s own culture, as well as the cultures
and values of others is vital to America’s success in the diverse and interconnected world (Stewart
2006, v; Gregory 2011, 367).
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In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, soft power and public diplomacy emerged as
common subjects in academic and policy debates. The largely unrewarding experience of America’s
engagement in the Middle East and societies like Iraq and Afghanistan has brought public diplomacy
back to the center of attention, but the importance of relations with allies, and the lessons that the U.S.
can learn from its public diplomacy efforts with its friends, are often disregarded. In order to better
understand the nature of soft power and evaluate its utility as a foreign policy tool for the United
States, this research examines whether Estonians’ exposure to Fulbright programs have changed their
beliefs about the U.S. and its role in the world.
Estonia, a former Soviet Republic, but a present-day NATO ally that enjoys security
guarantees from the United States is an interesting case to consider. Estonia and its Baltic neighbors
Latvia and Lithuania have received considerable attention in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine,
considering the geopolitical location in which the countries are located. During much of the Cold
War, Estonia was a soft power battlefield: heavily influenced by the Soviet propaganda as well as
channels like the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe from the West. Exploring the bilateral
relationship between the United States and Estonia is all the more relevant in light of President
Obama’s speech in Tallinn in September 2014, by some observers labeled the most important
security-related speech in the post-Cold War era.
This study uses a mixed methods approach: the first chapters draw on theoretical literature to
explain the issues regarding soft power and public diplomacy, and the case study is constructed based
on personal interviews, surveys, government documents, speeches, and other sources to explain U.S.
public diplomacy in Estonia. Since the impact of soft power is difficult to measure and often not
quantifiable or observable in the short term, the holistic single case-study format allows for richer
discussion about the context of the bilateral relationship, and the cultural, historical and political
factors that shape the relationship.
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The Estonian case study benefits from theoretical literature and interviews with government
officers from the U.S. Embassy in Tallinn and Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but at the center
of this case study are the responses from 26 Estonian participants who took part of the Fulbright
Student and Fulbright Scholar programs from 2009 to 2014. Additionally, as a control group, 54
Estonians with at least a Master’s degree and outstanding academic achievements were surveyed.
The similar, but not identical, online surveys included aspects of qualitative and quantitative research
techniques, but focus is on qualitative data and responses that were given to open-ended questions
about their perception of the United States, its role in the world, as well as about cultural and
educational exchange as a public diplomacy instrument. The methods of the case study are fully
discussed in chapter five.
It is important to note that this thesis explores the impact of U.S. public diplomacy on a very
narrow segment of the Estonian society. The case study participant samples are not representative in
any statistical sense, and therefore generalizations into the whole Estonian population are not viable.
However, the 74.3 percent participation rate among the participants of the Fulbright Program and 54
authorized participants among non-Fulbrighters provide a solid basis for theoretical observations and
allow making an overall judgment about to the impact of U.S. soft power on Estonia. While the focus
of this research is narrow, the group of people that are addressed is not inconsequential, and the value
of focusing on young, active, and educated people is their potential to become future societal and
political leaders and have a broader influence in a society. In addition to that, while this thesis
acknowledges the profound and conceivably growing importance of non-governmental organizations
and actors with regard to American soft power and public diplomacy, its approach considers U.S.
government as the central actor in this process. The main focus is on the instruments available for the
U.S. government to promote its values and advance its interests in the world, and issues like popular
culture and private media are not specifically addressed in this study.
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Chapter 1: Soft Power and Its Context
The idea of soft power cannot be discussed without understanding the nature of power itself.
Joseph Nye defines power simply as “the ability to get the outcomes you want” (2004, 1), however,
in the international relations theory, the situation is much more problematic. Although almost all of
the theories of international relations, in one way or another, recognize the importance of power,
there is no conclusive answer to the question of what power is. Therefore, Kenneth Waltz’ almost
thirty year old quote that defining the term power “remains a matter of controversy” holds true yet
today, and there is no solution in sight (Waltz 1986, 333). However, three major schools have
emerged that all have their distinct, if controversial, view of power: the first one sees power as
resources, the second frames power in relational terms, while the third school defines power by its
structural elements.
A conceptualization of power that focuses on the overall amount of capabilities of the state,
mainly in the form of military and economic might, is widely adopted in realist and neorealist
theories. The realist view is the first school of thought, articulated and argued by theorists like
Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau, operates on the assumption that the quantity and quality of
hard power resources is in direct correlation with a country’s position in the international structure.
Waltz articulates the importance of capabilities like population size, territory, economy, military
strength, as well as political stability and competence (1979, 131), while Morgenthau’s focus on
resources as a power surfaces in his idea of the “elements of national power” (Morgenthau 1954, 25).
The realist view is also reflected in the writings of Robert Gilpin who suggests that the sources of
power are limited to military, economic and technological means (1981, 13). Hard power theorists
assure that the national power, made up of certain material and immaterial resources, is all that a
country needs to shape outcomes in international politics. The second school casts power as a
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relational concept, and according to this view, the value of capabilities will always be determined by
the relational context. Max Weber (1947) defines power as “the probability that one actor within a
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance”. The third school
of scholars advocate for a theory that depicts power in structural terms. Susan Strange, one of the key
scholars in this school, argues that power over structures is more important than power over
resources, and suggests that there is no direct correlation between the existence of hard power
resources and their value in terms of changing the outcomes. She suggests that power can shape and
define the structures in which states operate and deal with each other and these structures become a
resource of power when it comes to establishing the norms, or what Steven Krasner (1985) calls
meta-power: the power “to change the rules of the game” (Pustovitovskij and Kremer 2012, 62).
Strange defines structural power as the power “to decide how things shall be done, the power to
shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate
enterprises” (Strange 1988, 25). Essentially, the structuralists argue that the ability to establish the
framework in which countries function and interact with each other is in itself a form of power.
With regard to the theoretical assumptions that the notion on which soft power operates, Nye
seems to have built his concept on several interpretations of power. Nye acknowledges the
practicality of the realist assumption of the centrality of the possession of resources, arguing that this
“makes power appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable” (Nye 2004). However, this
articulation does not fit into any of the preexisting theories. Nye argues that not all resources provide
equally good bases for power behavior under all circumstances and in all environments and states
that power is inherently relational (2011, 11). Despite the legitimate concerns that soft power is too
broad of a term to be useful and readily applicable, part of Nye’s contribution to the field lies in
making scholars and policy makers view and discuss power in broader terms and outside of any
preexisting theoretical straightjackets. Nye makes a case that the power does not require tangibility
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and argues that “It is wrong to think of power […] as ‘power over’ rather than ‘power with’ others”
(2010, 217-222).

The Definition and Features of Soft Power
In the 1990s, when Nye coined the term soft power, he argued that the capacity to have an
impact on the choices and preferences of other countries is often associated with immaterial power
resources like culture, ideology, and institutions (1990, 165–166). Nye continued to further develop
the idea of soft power, and in 2004 he defines it as “the ability to get what you want through
attraction rather than coercion or payment” (2004, x).
Nye makes the case that the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources:


its culture (in places where it is attractive to others),



its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad),



its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority (2004, 11).

In an effort to respond to his critics, Nye explains that soft power is a country’s ability to
entice and attract. Nye’s most recent definition of the term casts soft power as “the ability to affect
others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive
attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes” (2011, 20-21). Here, Nye makes the distinction
between three ways of affecting others: threats of coercion, inducements and payments, and
attraction. The first two options can alternatively be seen as “sticks” and “carrots”, and the third
category hinges on the sources of soft power. As Nye’s argument goes, the attraction that is created
by the sources of soft power can help a country achieve its goals without having to resort to coercion
or explicit inducements. Nye explains that the premise behind the powerfulness of attraction is that
when a country has values and qualities that other countries admire and emulate, they are likely to
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start acting in a way that is favorable to the country they admire (2008, 94-95). The problem,
however, is that what is considered legitimate and right is by no means universal and depends heavily
on the specific historical, cultural and social preconceptions of the interpreter. There is a universal
understanding that all power depends on context, for context sets the parameters of any stabilities and
imbalances. Put simply, the effectiveness of soft power resources depends as much on the partialities
of the interpreters as it depends on the resources themselves. As Hayden put it, “Soft power is based
upon a basic premise of what constitutes influence – yet this is by no means a universal formulation,”
arguing that different countries and societies have very different interpretations of the idea and
mechanisms of soft power (Hayden 2012, 11; Nye 2004b).
Nye’s conceptualization of soft power includes assumptions both about its sources and ways
to generate it, as well as the potential value soft power can have in terms of bringing about desired
policy change. Nye makes the case that soft power assets must be meritoriously leveraged, and
translating soft power into political power presupposes well-designed strategy and its application. In
terms of the definition, its dual nature is considered its key weakness. While it may be true that the
field of International Relations is all but defined by unsettled and ambiguous concepts, the notion of
soft power is even more complex – it resists generalization and thus makes a formation of a settled
theory very difficult (Commuri 2012, 43). One of the main weaknesses of the term soft power is that
it deals both with inputs and outputs of the process, as Hayden argues, it “functions at the same time
as a measure of resources as well as a reflection of outcomes” (Hayden 2012, 5). Some scholars
argue that while Nye’s concept of soft power is useful in policy debates, it is essentially unusable as
an analytical tool, and that in order to make the term soft power more concise, the range of issues it
deals with must be more manageable and the concept “disaggregated into separate ‘soft powers”
(Hall 2010, 191-193; ). To put it simply, in order for the concept to acquire some analytical value, the
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question of soft power resources should be separated from that of soft power outcomes. In Nye’s
view, attraction is the mechanism that analytically unites soft power resources.
Hall argues that the concept of attraction makes for an unwieldy theoretical tool because it is
unclear what exactly produces attraction whether and how can attraction be translated into support
(2010, 206-207). He is not challenging the substantive relevance of the term, but proposes three
alternative categories of analysis, and distinguishes between institutional power, reputation power,
and representational power (2010, 211), and that all describe different facets of power. Therefore, the
debate over the definition is well on its way, and, as Hayden argues, even Nye’s later and further
refined definitions have not succeeded in framing the notion in a succinct way, and that there is still
“considerable latitude in how the imperatives of soft power are interpreted and deployed” (2012, 5-7).
Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos are also critical about the definitional features of soft power,
are emphasize the concept’s resemblance to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in which the dominant
actor uses elements of consensus-building and coercion to maintain and advance its interests.
Christopher Layne argues that Nye’s work on power “blurs a complex relation between behaviors,
resources, and strategy” and criticizes Nye for expanding the definition beyond attraction in its
simplest form (2010, 55). Colin Gray, a prominent military and strategic thinker has been
particularly critical, stating, “Soft power is a heroically imprecise concept, save only with respect to
what it is not—hard power” (2011, 28). Nye maintains that soft power has an explicit value as a
source of influence, but contends that while soft power is necessary in complementing military and
economic power, it “cannot stand on its own as a strategic orientation” (Nye 2004, 129; Hayden 2012,
5). Nye acknowledges the complex relationship between hard and soft power, and agrees that, in
many cases, the two are very difficult or even impossible to disentangle.
While there are legitimate concerns about the value of the term soft power as an analytical
tool and the need to refine the concept, in general, scholars and policy professionals alike have come
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to acknowledge the value of soft power, particularly in the context of the modern interconnected
world. The transition from the bipolar world order that dominated during the Cold War to the one
that is much more uncertain , complex, and characterized by the abundance of actors and interests,
has changed the way global influence is seen and thought of. The advocates of soft power claim that
not only have the publics a certain degree of influence over the foreign policy makers of their own
country, but that international public opinion has considerable value (Hayden 2012, 7). Fareed
Zakaria argues that generating international public support for country’s view of the world is “a core
element of power, not merely an exercise in public relations” (2011, 273-274). This notion is
particularly appealing for the liberal camp in international relations, who believe that national
characteristics of individual states and their publics play an important role in determining their
position and goals in international affairs. Ali Wyne, who has extensively examined the role of world
public opinion in allowing the United States to exercise influence abroad, argues that “While it
would be foolish to base one’s foreign policy entirely on the whims of world opinion, it would be
equally, if not more, improvident to trivialize or ignore its impact” (Wyne 2009, 41). In this sense,
effective use of soft power does not include all-or-nothing type of solutions or having to choose
between soft and hard power. In the global era, any effective and durable solutions to the complex
problems will presuppose using a variety of methods and striking the right balance between different
forms of power.
Despite general consensus about the usefulness of the idea of soft power and its assumptions
about the importance of credibility and legitimacy, there are scholars and policy professionals who
question the overall value and utility of soft power even as a supplement to country’s other power
resources. Scholars like Kenneth Waltz, Joseph Joffe, Robert Kagan, Colin Gray, and Niall Ferguson,
several of whom are associated with the realist school of international relations, argue that hard
power is always at the core of soft power, and therefore the whole concept of soft power is

12

unpractical. As Ferguson put it, “the trouble with soft power is that it’s, well, soft” (2003). Realists
reject the idea that public opinion in any way guides or impacts foreign policy , believing that
popularity is ephemeral (Nye 2008, 128). This idea is reflected in senior statesman John J. McCloy’s
idea who once told President John F. Kennedy “[w]orld opinion? I don’t believe in world opinion.
The only thing that matters is power,” demonstrating his one-dimensional understanding of power
(quoted in Nye 2008, 96). Along the same lines, Layne maintains that there is very little evidence
that soft power has an impact on foreign policy. He argues that while ideas have the power to impact
foreign policy, it usually happens at the level of policymaking elites and that a nation’s public
opinion is not likely to have an impact on that state’s foreign policy (Layne 2010, 56). Layne argues
that Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq and other actions in the wake of 9/11 are “a textbook
example of how the state can use its power to shape public opinion and sell its preferred policies
even to a skeptical public” (2010, 57). Another set of soft power’s critics point to soft power’s fluid
and unpredictable nature and take Layne’s idea of how a state can use power to shape public opinion
to the other extreme by arguing that “soft power is something that exists essentially outside of
anyone’s reach” (Gray 2011, 30). Gray makes the argument that while the quantity and quality of the
application of instruments like military force and economic sanctions or authorizations can be easily
controlled “soft power does not lend itself to careful regulation, adjustment, and calibration” (2011,
30).
Nye’s response to the realist thinking has been swift; he sees soft power as an important
reality and argues that the realists “succumb to the ‘concrete fallacy’ that espouses that something is
not a power resource unless you can drop it on a city or on your foot” (2008, 96). However, much of
the criticisms to the idea of soft power is legitimate, and Nye himself, in his 2010 article
“Responding to my critics and concluding thoughts” has shown openness and desire for debate
regarding soft power. In the article, Nye himself points out that although soft power is one of the
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most important realities of the newly emerged global political landscape, and power really is
becoming less tangible and less coercive among the advanced democracies, most of the world does
not consist of advanced democracies and that “limits the transformation of power” (2004, 129).
In many ways, the complexity of the modern world reveals inadequacies of the realist
thinking, and the inherent relativeness of soft power does not undermine its real life value. Critics are
right to argue that unpredictability is inherent in the idea of soft power, and that there is always the
danger that soft power can incite resentment and hostility instead of creating understanding and
goodwill, but developing cultural expertise and becoming skillful in intercultural communication can
go a long way in effectively controlling and using soft power. Nye’s conceptualization of soft power
has a robust cultural component, and the role of culture in the soft power process is two-fold. To
begin with, culture, in addition to political values and foreign policy, is one of the resources of soft
power. Secondly, given that soft power rests on some shared values, culture of any target audience
can be the single most important element that determines the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of any
soft power proposition. In other words, culture places certain constraints on the idea of soft power,
and different beliefs and sets of values are the reason why not everyone will be equally persuaded by
any particular soft power endeavor.
In international relations and foreign policy, culture is a powerful but often neglected concept.
Culture is the foundation for creating global dialogue and it provides the channels through which
people understand each other. Valerie Hudson has contributed enormously to culture in foreign
policy analysis, and she argues that foreign policy makers have to be sensitive to the environment of
those whose behavior they try to explain. According to Hudson, cultural explanations are the most
effective when “in the eyes of policymakers, times are turbulent and/or issues of legitimacy and
identity loom large” (1997, 270). Even though the concept of culture enjoyed certain popularity in
the 1960s and early 1970s and among the most enduring and profound sources of foreign policy,
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cultural explanations have fallen into disfavor (Van Tassell 1997, 234). Vertzberger argues that much
of this has to do with the fact that it is very difficult to prove the causal links between societalcultural variables and foreign policy-related information processing., but argues that the difficulty of
directly observing them does not mean that “the societal-cultural differences are minor of negligible”
it is rather the opposite (1990, 261). Howard Wiarda in his Culture and Foreign Policy: The
Neglected Factor in International Relations argues that “We are so sensitive about race and ethnicity
that we would rather avoid political culture variables altogether rather than bringing them up in
“polite company” (2013, 10). He proceeds, “That is a terrible mistake because it obliges us to ignore
a key social science explanation” (2013, 11). This can be exceptionally unforgiving when it comes
to designing foreign policy and communicating with people from other nations.
Culture is not singular or univocal, as Carey argues, “[i]t is, like nature itself, multiple,
various, and varietal” (Carey 2009, 50). Culture as a concept is extremely difficult to define and
difficult to deal with, largely because “problems of definition and measurement and cause-and-effect
relationship between culture and other variables like policies, institutions, economic development run
in both directions” (Harrison 2000, xxxii). It is clear that if culture includes everything, it explains
nothing, and therefore different scholars have come up with a variety of definitions. For Harkovich,
culture is the “human made part of the environment” (quoted in Hudson 1997, 2). Isard explains it as
“the body of customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits constituting a distinct complex of
tradition of a social group”, while van Tassell sees culture as comprising “a nation’s core interests,
geography, perceptions/images, and historical experience” (1997, 234). The American
anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) argue that culture consists of “patterns, explicit and
implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive
achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture
consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values;
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culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, and on the other as
conditioning elements of further action." Geertz (1973) argues that “Culture is an historically
transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in
symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about
and attitudes towards life” (quoted in Hudson 1997, 3). In Nye’s conceptualization, culture is the “set
of values and practices that create meaning for a society” (2004, 11).
There is no one right definition of culture, but its significance is particularly apparent in its
ability to inform identities and reflect beliefs and values that are prevalent in any society. What is
common to many of the different definitions of culture, is that the beliefs and values that are
characteristic to a certain community often remain unconscious to those who hold them. Culture has
a power to influence any cost-benefit analysis and is therefore of paramount importance in
understanding international politics. For any soft power propositions, the fact that cultures vary and
different cultural groups think, feel, and act differently dictates the necessity of having a deep
understanding of the context and both countries involved.
If anything, the importance of culture has grown in the post-Cold War era. President George
H. W. Bush’s notion of the “New World Order” and Francis Fukuyama’s ideas in his renowned book
The End of History tricked some into believing that the downfall of communism ushered in an era
that was to be described by global understanding, influx of international trade, and most importantly,
the unwavering dominance of democracy. In fact, as Wiarda and Taylor argue, it was unrealistic to
think that history, geography, resources, and culture no longer mattered, and what Fukuyama
described as the end of history, was nothing more than “an end of ideology” (2009, 14; Wiarda 2013,
22). Thus, in some respects, the end of the Cold War brought a revival of interest in the concept of
culture, for while the bipolar world order had undermined domestic idiosyncrasies of nations, the
collapse of the Soviet system brought new ideas of nationalism and the formation of national identity
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(Hudson 1997, 1). In the beginning of the 21st century, modernization theorists argued that the world
was changing in ways that eroded traditional values, for economic development is often associated
with the decline of religion and cultural differences (Inglehart 2000, 82). The weakness of the
arguments made by the modernization theorists is demonstrated by Peter Berger, who maintains that
there is not just one but “many globalizations.” The evidence for this argument stems from the
diverse ways in which globalization has affected different countries and regions, thereby producing
more, rather than less, diversity (Wiarda 2013, 7). Cultural differences are here to stay, and each
culture defines its own goals and ethics, which should not be evaluated against the goals and ethic of
another culture (Harrison 2000, xxvi). At the same time, dividing humanity into groups – based on
similar values, institutions, and behavior patterns – is inevitable, and if done skillfully, can be helpful
in navigating in an increasingly complex and dynamic world (Banerjee 1997, 31-33; Wiarda 2013,
135).
In conclusion, understanding culture and its role in soft power and international politics is of
paramount importance for this research. Critics of the term soft power consider its inherent
variability and heavy reliance on the context one of its key weaknesses, but they fail to acknowledge
the potential of culture – a foundation of nation’s beliefs and values – in shaping soft power
outcomes.
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Chapter 2: Soft Power and Policy: The American Experience
Soft power and the American Experience
“American soft power is our Superman. It’s a blessing and a curse”
(Nancy Snow 2009, 3).
Not only is the United States the world’s only military superpower, but there is no other
country in the world that could match the cultural reach of the United States. As Nye puts it,
“Rome’s and Soviet Russia’s cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. America’s
soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets” (2004, 126). The U.S. with
its cultural sway and economic resources possesses countless material and immaterial resources
that have the potential to generate soft power (Nye 2008, 33). Despite its active engagement in
peacekeeping and nation building missions around the world, it is likely that the most important
way in which the U.S. has promoted democracy, has been to set an example that can inspire
other nations. The U.S. government is built on principles and values that are appealing to many,
and in her book The Idea That Is America, Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that it is precisely these
American values that link the country to the world. She suggests “The belief that American
values are universal values—that all men and women are created equal, that all are entitled to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, regardless of race, creed, or nationality – connects us to
other nations” (2007, 7).
While there is plenty of evidence that American values are not universal in some absolute
sense, U.S.’ democratic values are similar to those of many other nations, particularly in an
information age in which people believe in freedom of expression and participation (Nye 2010,
217). This argument is strengthened by the idea that Western values are suggested by several
clauses in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as Harrison argues, “the
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idea that “[…] progress in the Western sense has become a virtually universal aspiration. The
idea of progress – of a longer, healthier, less burdensome, more fulfilling life – is not confined to
the West; it is also explicit in Confucianism and in the creeds of a number of non-Western, nonConfucian high-achieving minorities” (2000, xxvi).
In his reasoning, Nye displays skepticism for the label “West” and suggests that he does
not see community forming, but contends that in many instances transatlantic differences are
inflated and “Europe remains the part of the world closest to U.S. basic values” (2002, 33–35).
While it is true that some basic Western values are more broadly shared than others, America’s
cultural dominance in the world cuts both ways. Geiger is right to point out that “by directing our
attention to American power, soft power reinforces the idea of American culture as universal,”
leaving many Americans and non-Americans not only to disagree, but in some cases creating a
great deal of resentment and active opposition (Geiger 2010, 101). With its cultural sway and
power, the United States cannot and will never be universally loved, “and it would be a mistake
to try” as Peterson et al. persuasively suggest (2003, 5). In some parts of the world, particularly
those marked by high rates of poverty, inequality, and a sense of hopelessness among the people,
the United States as the world leader has come to represent everything that has gone wrong, and
their detestation of the U.S. is so entrenched and irrational that they cannot be convinced to
change their opinions about the country. As Joseph Gordon put it,
“It is true that core al Qaeda members and other committed terrorists are unlikely
to be mollified by a U.S. commitment to implement the Geneva Conventions, but
it is also true that in a political war of ideas, millions of people around the world
are judging US actions to determine whether they want to be on America’s side,
fight against it, or sit on the fence (2007, 70).
In places like the Middle East, it is a fight for the middle ground and to explain to people with
moderate views that even though the United States is strong and powerful, it is “not the enemy”
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and it “represents a way of life marked by democracy, openness, and rule of law – and that this is
a life worth aspiring to” (Peterson et al. 2003, 27). However, the problem in the years following
the attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq was that not only America’s enemies, but its
friends, open and democratic countries would “think we no longer listen or learn, but that we
instead insist that the American way is the only way” (Slaughter 2007, 224-225). The Bush
administration and its approach of “terrorizing the terrorist” left the world to see the U.S. as
arrogant and self-absorbed, and produced for the country many more enemies than friends
(Armstrong 2009, 65). The 2003 report of an independent task force sponsored by the Council of
Foreign Relations (CFR) maintains that America’s “military victory in Iraq was impressive,” but
poses the rhetorical question “[w]hat has the United States gained if it loses the good opinion of
mankind?” (Peterson et al. 2003, v).
Especially during this period, despite being the home continent that coined the term soft
power, the United States was criticized for its allegedly excessive attraction to hard power and
military solutions. This divergence is especially stark in comparison to U.S. allies in Europe,
who resort to force much more hesitantly. Neoconservative thinker Robert Kagan starts his
article “Strength and Weakness” with an illustration that modern Europe is “entering a posthistorical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace.”
Kagan argues that the U.S., meanwhile, “remains mired in history, exercising power in the
anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true
security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depends on the possession and use
of military might” (2004, 134). In fact, Kagan criticizes Europe’s excessive reliance on soft
power tactics and defends America’s assertive request to seek finality in international affairs, but
during the Bush era, the limits of America’s military power were on full display. While many
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American allies in Europe and elsewhere – as some argue, often excessively – rely on U.S.
security guarantees and benefit from its active role in the realm of global defense, they were
alarmed by America’s actions and its conviction that it possessed a special right to exert its
power in the world (Krige 2010, 122). As President Bush declared the War on Terror, he made
clear that he welcomed allies who wanted to join him, but also that he would not be prepared to
compromise to win their support. “At some point we may be the only ones left,” he said in the
fall of 2001, “That’s okay with me. We are America” (quoted in Gordon 2007, 30-31). The Bush
administration’s willingness to act unilaterally and disregard rules and norms of the international
community shocked Europeans and was something out of the ordinary in U.S. foreign policy. In
Errol Morris’ documentary “The Fog of War” former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara set out lessons for U.S. foreign policy makers. In the lesson “Be prepared to
reexamine your reasoning” McNamara argues,
What makes us omniscient? Have we a record of omniscience? We are the
strongest nation in the world today. I do not believe that we should ever apply that
economic, political, and military power unilaterally. If we had followed that rule
in Vietnam, we wouldn't have been there. None of our allies supported us. Not
Japan, not Germany, not Britain or France. If we can't persuade nations with
comparable values of the merit of our cause, we'd better reexamine our reasoning.
(emphasis added, quoted in Errol Morris’ documentary “The Fog of War”)
The Bush administration failed not only to follow this policy advice and reconsider the way it
used military force, but, as Zakaria argues, it “almost boasted its disdain for treaties, multilateral
organizations, international public opinion, and everything that suggested a conciliatory
approach to world politics” (2011, 246). In particular, the criticism had to do with the
administration’s decision to reject the Kyoto climate change program and its refusal to support
the creation of the International Criminal Court. As Peterson et al. argue, there must have been a
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better way to articulate the specific concerns about the two projects instead of just leaving the
negotiating table (2003, 3). The substance, but especially the style, of the foreign policy
conducted by President Bush and his close advisors were all the more surprising given that
American history shows the importance of trustworthiness and good relations with friends and
allies. America’s success in the Cold War was at least in part founded on the idea that while the
Soviet Union was feared by its allies, “the U.S. was loved – or at least liked” (Zakaria 2011).
Faced with the “fundamental loss of goodwill and trust from publics around the world”,
reigniting America’s credibility and striking the proper balance between the application of
America’s soft and hard power became a major topic following President Bush’s first term in
office (Peterson 2003, v). Remarkably, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike
Mullen and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates were among experts who advocated for
“demilitarizing American foreign policy” and investing more in the tools of civilian engagements
like diplomacy and development (Slaughter 2010). However, regaining the high moral ground
was not going to be easy: as Gates agues, “The solution is not to be found in some slick PR
campaign or by trying to out-propagandize al-Qaeda, but rather through the steady accumulation
of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time” (quoted in Lord 2008, 10). To
win back the hearts and minds of America’s friends and to create goodwill among U.S’ foes,
public diplomacy – the main instrument of American soft power – had to be brought back into
the center of U.S. foreign policy making process. In fact, during the second term of the Bush
presidency, the President and his administration became much more aware of the crucial role of
public diplomacy in a world characterized by interconnectedness and abundance of actors.
However, the fundamental shift towards public diplomacy as a core task of any diplomatic
missions became when President Obama assumed office in 2009.
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The Concept of Public Diplomacy
Before moving on to explain the historical role of public diplomacy in U.S. foreign policy
and consider its resurgence under the Obama administration, it is important to understand the
theoretical background of concept itself. Public diplomacy, similarly to its originator term
diplomacy, acknowledges the power of negotiation and cooperation, and the limits to military
might and brute force. Diplomacy means resolving international difficulties peacefully and
through negotiations between accredited representatives of states (Melissen 2005). The basic
difference between diplomacy and public diplomacy is that while the first is mainly concerned
with intergovernmental relations, the latter attempts to engage directly with foreign publics.
Somewhat paradoxically, the term public diplomacy was coined almost thirty years before the
concept of soft power, which provides the basis for, and justifies investing in, public diplomacy,
came to prominence. In the U.S., the idea of public diplomacy was first circulated already in the
1960s. Edmund Gullion, a retired foreign service officer and the dean of the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, gave the first account of public diplomacy as follows:
Public diplomacy . . . deals with the inﬂuence of public attitudes on the formation
and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international
relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of
public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and
interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign aﬀairs and its
impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication,
as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural
communications
(Gullion 1965, quoted in Cull 2009, 19).
The essence of public diplomacy, its recognition of the importance of public opinion and
intercultural communication for foreign policy, has remained constant, but there are a variety of
different ways that public diplomacy is defined. Nye sees public diplomacy as “an instrument
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that governments use to mobilize [soft power] resources to communicate with and attract the
publics of other countries” (Hayden 2012, 6). Another prominent definition comes from
American political scientist Milton Cummings, who sees it as the “exchange of ideas,
information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster
mutual understanding” (2003, 1). In his definition, Hayden is more specific and casts public
diplomacy as “an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through
engagement with a foreign public;” he considers that it is “not about changing the public
unilaterally, but the proactive engagement of global audiences in support of a foreign policy that
will stand alone and influence public opinion positively” (2012, 9). Gregory emphasizes the
connection between public diplomacy and strategic communication and claims that public
diplomacy is “an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and nonstate actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage relationships; and
influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values” (Gregory 2014, 7).
Public diplomacy is an increasingly popular research topic and scholars have distinguished
three general categories of activity, according to Kelley:


Information: information management and distribution with an emphasis on short-term
events or crises;



Inﬂuence: longer-term persuasion campaigns aiming to eﬀect attitudinal change amongst a
target population;



Engagement: building relationships, also over the long term, to cultivate trust and mutual
understanding between peoples (2009, 73).

Gregory’s account of the dimensions of public diplomacy is very similar. He makes the
distinction between three time frames in public diplomacy communication: 24/7 news streams,
medium range campaigns on high value policies, and long-term engagement (Hayden 2012, 3).
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The most immediate form of public diplomacy is the one of daily communication, including the
use of media, broadcasting, and increasingly the presence in different platforms of social media.
Although the spread of the internet and popularity of social media has made it much easier for
public diplomacy makers to reach out to new audiences and sustain a daily interaction, the
broader context of abundance of information leave public diplomacy makers to compete for
people’s attention. The second category, sometimes cast as strategic communication, includes
persuasion campaigns, one-way messages, presidential and other high-level speeches that are
crafted for a specific audience and meant to advance the interests of the state in a way that would
resonate with the foreign publics and their understanding of the world (Hayden 2012, 14). The
third element in public diplomacy is about long-term engagement and designed to create genuine
two-way dialogues and build personal contacts in a way that broadcasting or speeches never
could (Lord 2008, 39). Although all three dimensions of public diplomacy are crucial and at their
best enforce and improve each other, the long-term engagement is often considered to be the
most profound of the three elements of public diplomacy and have the highest potential to
cultivate trust and understanding (Kelley 2009).
Public diplomacy is a conflated term, and while there is general agreement among
scholars that public diplomacy encompasses actions like strategic communication, cultural
diplomacy, international broadcasting, exchange programs, publication of materials and even
nation-branding, its connections with the term propaganda are different (Hayden 2012, 10).
Gullion, who coined the term public diplomacy to describe the work done by United States
Information Agency (USIA), in the late 1960s argued he “would have liked to call it
‘propaganda’” because “it seemed the nearest thing in the pure interpretation of the word to what
we were doing” (quoted in Armstrong 2009, 65). Given the negative connotations of the term
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propaganda, starting from the 1970s, the more benign term public diplomacy gained popularity.
Nye, Snow, and John Brown argue that the two cannot be used interchangeably, though as
Brown puts it, “the intent of the practitioners of public diplomacy and propaganda may be the
same” since both have the potential to improve the credibility with specific audiences (2012,
original emphasis). Brown distinguishes between the two by arguing that public diplomacy “at
its best” presents a truthful image of nation’s foreign policy and way of life, encourages
understanding and creates dialogue; propaganda “at its worst” misrepresents the facts,
oversimplifies issues like history and foreign policy, forces its messages on an audience and
demonizes elements of the outside world (Brown 2012). Affirming the difference between the
two, Nye argues that “Public diplomacy that degenerates into propaganda not only fails to
convince, but can undercut soft power” (2008, 108; Kelley 2009, 75).
Another important element in understanding the idea of public diplomacy is
understanding its differences from what is widely known as cultural internationalism or cultural
globalization. The two interrelated terms describe the new reality where the transformations in
technology and communication, as well as increased travelling have produced a world in which
much of its cultural content is readily available for people around the world. As Gregory argues,
“It is public diplomacy when a student reads Mark Twain’s novel Huckleberry Finn in a USfunded Lincoln Center in Pakistan. When that student downloads Huckleberry Finn from Google
Books, it can be thought of as cultural internationalism” (2011, 359). In other words, much of
cross-cultural communication takes place outside of the realm of public diplomacy, and the term
presupposes some kind of action or involvement – even in the form of financial sponsor – from a
government.
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The prospects of reaching a comprehensive and universally satisfactory definition for the
dynamic and reactive phenomenon of public diplomacy are dim. In fact, the trend seems to be
moving in a direction in which public diplomacy as a subcategory of diplomacy becomes
essentially irrelevant. As Gregory argues, the term public diplomacy “[…] marginalizes
diplomacy’s public dimension, which is now central in what all diplomatic actors think and do”
(Gregory 2014, 3). Gregory does not foresee an abrupt end to the use of the term, but contends
that as “a subset of diplomatic practice [public diplomacy] is no longer adequate for the mind
shifts and holistic approaches required by more diplomats, more people, and more issues” (2014,
11). Gregory is not alone in arguing that public diplomacy is likely to define the future of
diplomacy, the idea that the relevance of communicating to foreign publics “transcends method,
time, and purpose” (Hayden 2012, 9; Melissen 2007; Graffy 2009; Riordan 2005).
Public Diplomacy and the American Experience
“For example, public relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at
communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, about
freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. It is just plain embarrassing that alQaeda is better at communicating its message on the internet than America. As one foreign
diplomat asked a couple of years ago, “How has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate
the world’s greatest communication society?” Speed, agility, and cultural relevance are not terms
that come readily to mind when discussing U.S. strategic communications”
Robert Gates, Remarks at Kansas State University, 2007
Given that the United States with its cultural sway, broad diaspora, economic resources
and technological advancement is probably to be better-equipped for effective public diplomacy
than any other country in the world, Robert Gates’ grim account of the situation in the post-9/11
era is even more disturbing (Lord 2008, 4). America has had a long and generally successful
historical experience with public diplomacy, though the specific tactics, initiatives, focus areas
and resources have been subject to constant change (Lord 2008, 29).
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During the Cold War era, as Henry Kissinger argues, the “predominant aspect of the new
diplomacy is its psychological dimension,” both in terms of communication with the enemies
and allies (quoted in Armstrong 2009, 65-66). With regard to enemies, Kissinger’s idea refers to
the term psychological warfare, commonly defined as “use of propaganda against an enemy,
supported by such military, economic, or political measures as may be required” (Encyclopedia
Britannica). Perhaps even more important was America’s engagement with its friends and allies
often done by the means of broadcasting, especially through radio. U.S. government-sponsored
channels like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe were designed to present America’s
views and values around the world, giving many an opportunity to have an alternative source of
news to the dominant communist or Soviet state television and radio. When former U.S.
Secretary of State George Shultz commented on America’s controversial decision to deploy
NATO-sanctioned intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Western Europe in 1983, Shultz
argued that America’s public diplomacy helped the U.S. make its case to deploy to its European
Allies, “I don’t think we could have pulled it oﬀ if it hadn’t been for a very active program of
public diplomacy. Because the Soviets were very active all through 1983 [...] with peace
movements and all kinds of efforts to dissuade our friends in Europe from deploying” (quoted in
Kelley 2009, 76-77).
Nye likewise believes that U.S. public diplomacy was a crucial factor in America’s
victory in the Cold War. I particular, he emphasizes the role of U.S. government-sponsored
exchange programs that brought elements of Soviet elite to the United States to expose the
exchangees with American values and provide an alternative vision to the communist reality.
Various scholarship programs, seminars and conferences engaged more than 700,000 people
over the postwar period, and included future world leaders like Helmut Schmidt, Anwar Sadat,
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and Margaret Thatcher (Nye 2004, 109). Given the nature of the Cold War ideological battle,
U.S.’ hope was that the exchangees would return home and become advocates of liberal reforms,
thereby helping the U.S. undermine Moscow’s grip on the Warsaw Pact nations. Although it is
difficult to demonstrate the specific causal significance of American soft power in bringing about
the end of the Cold War, there is broad agreement that the constant presentation of Western
values and living standards attracted people on the other side of the Iron Curtain and helped
undermine the communist system. This is particularly true for Ronald Reagan and his
administration, for the heavy emphasis on public diplomacy and his belief in the power of ideas
is believed to have hastened the fall of the Soviet Union.
The end of the Cold War brought about significant changes in geopolitics and many of
them carried over to the realm of U.S. public diplomacy. The funding for the broadcasting
programs was cut back dramatically, U.S. cultural centers in many places of the world were
closed, and the level of government-sponsored exchanges dropped. While the direct impact of
these dynamics is difficult to assess, the shift of focus away from public diplomacy was harmful
for U.S.’ credibility in the world, and contributed to the misunderstandings between Americans
and international populaces. Martha Bayles explains these dynamics by arguing, “America’s
victory over the once-mighty Soviet Union seemed to validate not only its economic system but
also its political institutions and, indeed, its whole way of life” (2014, 5). While in principle,
public diplomacy was supported by the George H. W. Bush administration, this support did not
translate into real foreign policy making and United States Information Agency (USIA) – an
institution that was charged with many of the public diplomacy tasks – was swiftly driven to the
margins of the administration's foreign policy-making structure. A watershed moment for the
U.S. government-sponsored Voice of America radio station came in 1989 when Beijing students
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gathered in Tiananmen Square to demonstrate their support for liberal reforms. The
correspondents of VOA's Beijing bureau were at the forefront of communicating the whole story
to the world and provided a clear reminder of the relevance of VOA in the post-Cold War world.
The problem, however, was that with its objective coverage of the situation, the Chinese
government attacked VOA and caused the “toning down” of some aspects of the coverage, since
the Bush administration was not willing to risk the long-term Sino-American relationship for the
objective coverage of the Tiananmen crisis (Cull 2010). Unsurprisingly, such hypocrisy
undermined U.S. credibility and legitimacy in the world, and many argue that the mishandling of
public diplomacy continued during the Clinton administration. Most importantly, in 1999, the
Clinton administration dissolved USIA, putting public diplomacy to the back burner, and, as
Schneider puts it “effectively showcasing the attributes of a free society, cultural diplomacy had
made itself obsolete, or so many thought” (2006, 193). While the funding of the public
diplomacy programs had always been contentious, the Clinton administration and the ‘anti-arts’
sentiment in Congress further narrowed down many public diplomacy programs, believing that
outreach to foreign publics was no longer important (Schneider 2006, 193; Fitzpatrick 2011, 5).
The skeptics of public diplomacy argue that since the end of the Cold War, spending
money on broadcasting and international exchanges is a waste of resources: “Why pour money
into VOA when CNN, MSNBC, or Fox can do the work for free?” (Nye 2008, 105). At the same
time, those persistent in calling for U.S. government action in the cultural arena argue that
private media and Hollywood production tends to represent the U.S. in an overly simplistic and
one dimensional way and that there is misunderstandings about interpretations of freedom,
democracy and the American persona (Bayles 2014, 3; Nye 2008, 105). Despite the efforts of
numerous public diplomacy advocates to explain the importance of supplementing the images
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promulgated by popular culture with a more accurate and nuanced vision of the U.S. and the
American way of life, U.S. public diplomacy in the post-Cold war era was characterized by lack
of interest and funding, and general underperformance.
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the idea of public diplomacy gained
considerable attention. Particularly in the wake of the U.S.-led war in Iraq, world opinion of the
United States and U.S. policy plummeted and produced widespread anger, fear, and mistrust. In
October 2001, President George W. Bush said, “I’m amazed that there is such misunderstanding
of what our country is about, that people would hate us. Like most Americans, I just can’t
believe it. Because I know how good we are. We’ve got to do a better job of making our case”
(quoted in Snow 2009, 7). While the idea of strengthening public communications and
improving public diplomacy programs was widely seen as reasonable, the way in which these
campaigns were carried out had significant weaknesses. Getting America’s message out –
particularly in the Arab and Islamic world – became Washington’s primary goal (Zaharna 2009,
2). Some of the specific programs geared to these ends were the creation of a fact book The
Network of Terror by the State Department, and the 2002 Shared Values campaign, that raised
various ethical questions for looking like an international advertising campaign that attempted to
“brand and even sell America to the Islamic world” (Zaharna 2009, 3). The shortcomings of
extensive and forceful persuasive campaigns became apparent when the Bush administration was
increasingly criticized for paying too little attention to listening and creating meaningful human
interactions. The top-down fashion lecturing helped reinforce the image of Americans as
arrogant and self-centered, and the Cold War-style defensive and vigorous persuasion campaign
was not a match to the new and complex issues and problems.
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Many scholars and professionals argued that increased messaging was not going to help the
U.S. advance its interests, and that in order for the U.S. public diplomacy to be effective given
the new circumstances, “old forms of diplomatic monologue” had to be replaced by – or at least
supplemented with – “new forms of diplomatic dialogue and collaboration” (Fitzpartick 2011, 6;
Krause and van Evera 2009). Increasingly, the Bush administration took note of the problems,
and in 2005, changes were ahead when Karen Hughes, who had previously served as a
communication advisor for the administration, was tasked with leading U.S. public diplomacy.
Hughes understood the role of listening as a public diplomacy measure, but her “listening tour”
to the Arab and Islamic world was still considered as a failure, when during the trip, “Hughes
was described as painfully clueless” about the historical and cultural realities of the region,
treating it as a broad and undefined monolithic mass (Zaharna 2009, 4). Despite this failure, the
importance of listening and creating dialogue rather than fighting an information battle was a key
lesson from the Bush administration, and revealed fundamental changes in the international
context in which U.S. public diplomacy operates.
The roots of the communication and public diplomacy glitches of the Bush administration
reach far beyond the beginning of the new century. The complexity and deep roots of the
problems regarding the rise of extremism and international terrorism were sometimes associated
with the mounting misunderstanding between the U.S. and parts of the world, and country’s lack
of commitment to public diplomacy during the whole post-Cold War era. In addition to that, the
conditions were fundamentally different from that of the Clinton administration, and Bush
administration. Power diffusion, the abundance of actors and issues, unclear boundaries between
foreign and domestic, innovative digital technologies and new media changed the calculus
(Gregory 2014, 5). In other words, the forces of globalization and the advancements in
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technology had eroded the traditional power hierarchies and created a situation where nationstates increasingly found themselves impacted by non-state actors, networks, and increasing
people-to-people contact. For this reason, engaging with foreign publics presupposed a new
approach, and many scholars agreed the institutions, methods and priorities of U.S. public
diplomacy needed “transformation rather than adaptation” (Gregory 2011, 351; Gregory 2011a,
788; Lord 2008, 1; Fitzpatrick 2011, 8–13).
The Obama Effect
Although significant changes in the way U.S. public diplomacy was conducted took place
during President Bush’s second term, the opportunity for a real change and fresh start came in
2009 when Barack Obama became the 44th President of the United States. Already in his
inauguration speech, President Obama promised to reach out to people all over the world in a
way that emphasized mutual respect and tolerance (The White House 2011, Gregory 2011a, 787;
Fitzpatrick 2011, 7). In his inaugural address, president Obama said that under his administration
the U.S. will not rely excessively on military power, but emphasize diplomacy and cooperation
with allies: “Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with
missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions” (The White House 2009).
In addition to improving relations with allies, President Obama’s particular commitment was to
improving relations with the Muslim world, signified by his renowned speech at Cairo
University in June 2009.
The speech that sought a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around
the world covered a range of topics from violent extremism and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to
religious freedoms and the President’s plan to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay by early 2010.
First and foremost, the speech received attention because it represented a completely different –
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much more collaborative and humble – attitude and style of communication. For instance,
President Obama argued that “[e]ach nation gives life to this principle in its own way, grounded
in the traditions of its own people” and maintained “America does not presume to know what is
best for everyone” but suggested the U.S. would stand by rule of law, freedom and justice,
framing them as human rights (The White House 2009a; National Security Strategy 2010, 36).
He made it clear that there were limits to what military power can achieve, arguing “[t]here must
be a sustained effort to listen to each other; to learn from each other; to respect one another; and
to seek common ground” (The White House 2009a).
The election of President Obama helped restore faith in American values in many parts of
the world. Nye quotes a high-ranking British political leader, who in 2008 said, “[i]n one stroke,
the election of Obama has changed the American image in the eyes of billions of people,
showing the extraordinary capacity of the United States to renew itself”, creating an illusion that
the support for the United States was almost universal (2010, 222). While the change in
America’s moral position in the world was significant, as Table 1 shows, hoping that the
differences would disappear was much too optimistic.
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Table 1: Favorability of the United States in Selected Countries
2008 2009 Net change
France
42
75
33
Germany
31
64
33
Mexico
47
69
22
UK
53
69
16
China
41
47
6
Egypt
22
27
5
Japan
50
59
5
Lebanon
51
55
4
Kenya
(87)
90
3
Turkey
12
14
2
Poland
68
67
-1
Russia
46
44
-2
Pakistan
19
16
-3
Source: Pew Research Center, Spring 2014 Global Attitudes Survey
The U.S. significantly improved its favorability among its allies in Europe and elsewhere, though
this was not the case in all places around the world, demonstrating that the alleged “Obama
effect” – the idea that his persona and theme of change could rejuvenate U.S.’ moral authority
and legitimacy in the world – had its limits. While a portion of America’s enemies will never see
the country in a positive light, the sustainability of the upswing in favorability was questionable
even among U.S.’ friends and allies. President Obama proved his words during his first years in
office when the strategic documents like the “National Security Strategy”, “Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review”, and “Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy”
outlined by the Obama administration reconfirmed the commitment to redefine the way the
United States engaged with the world. President Obama and Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton,
presented public diplomacy as “a core diplomatic mission” and were committed to increasing
people-to-people contacts and paying more attention to differences in cultures and values. The
first “Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review” of 2010 emphasizes the potential of
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civilian power, and calls for engaging with actors like NGOs, corporations, civil society groups
in conducting public diplomacy (QDDR 2010, viii). As Gregory notes, in comparison with the
earlier times, there was a lot of progress and the rhetoric suggested a real opportunity, but it was
clear that the symbols had to backed up by specific policy actions (2011, 351; Taylor 2010, 163).
In fact, the inability of the administration to close the gap between its words and deeds became
apparent early on. While President Obama’s messages about closing the contention center at
Guantanamo Bay and quickly winding up the war in Afghanistan had been powerful and widely
appealing, the administration’s apparent inability to take real action undermined its credibility.
In the realm of public diplomacy, a similar trend emerged. Fitzpatrick in her
comprehensive 2011 report talks about the transition of U.S. public diplomacy “from messaging
to mutuality,” arguing that although many of the changes that have been taken place are the right
ones, there are some inconsistencies between the official rhetoric and the way public diplomacy
is actually practiced (2011, 33). Fitzpatrick claims that the progress towards more open and
interactive engagement is obvious, and that the Obama administration’s model of engagement is
right to emphasize the use of dialogue, but that it “does not meet the requirements of genuine
dialogue” which she considers one in which “both the nation and its foreign publics are subject
to persuasion and dialogue is used to achieve mutual understanding and benefits” (2011, 8).
Building on Dutta-Bergman’s theory, Fitzpatrick compares dialogic public diplomacy to
diplomacy in its traditional form, having an “objective of influencing the receiver countries
without being open to persuasion” (Fitzpatrick 2011, 10). Scott-Smith has been similarly critical,
arguing that although the U.S. public diplomacy outlook recognizes the changing global
environment, it is marked by “a desire to do nothing but control it” (2010, 171). Whatever the
reason, the foreign publics are also increasingly skeptical of President Obama’s performance:
36

during his two terms, the approval ratings for President Obama have declined almost everywhere
in the world. As Table 2 shows, the approval ratings are still considerably higher than those of
President Bush in 2008, but the decline is indicative of hoping that public diplomacy was not
necessary was much too optimistic.
Table 2: Approval Ratings of President Bush and President Obama in Selected Countries

France
Germany
Mexico
UK
China
Egypt
Japan
Lebanon
Turkey
Poland
Russia
Pakistan

Bush Obama Obama Obama
2008 2009
2012
2014
13
91
86
83
14
93
87
71
16
55
42
40
16
86
80
74
30
62
38
51
11
42
29
19
25
85
74
60
33
46
39
35
2
33
24
24
41
62
50
55
22
37
36
15
7
13
7
7
Sources: Pew Research Center, 2008 Global Attitudes Project;
Pew Research Center, Spring 2014 Global Attitudes Survey

Any approval ratings should not be, and are not, the driving force of U.S. foreign policy,
and the American President, first and foremost serves the interests of the American people.
However, as history shows, taking the interests of others into account and engaging with them in
a meaningful way is crucial to the success of U.S. foreign policy. This is especially the case in
this global era, when the security of the U.S. depends on its ability to cooperate with other
nations. Legitimacy and mutual trust are the foundation of any collaboration, and public
diplomacy, “if it is conducted thoughtfully and effectively, has the potential to build bridges and
rebuild trust” (Taylor 2010, 163). To be sure, success in public diplomacy is always going to be
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easier in some places than others – for the when the country and its foreign policies are
fundamentally unpopular, no exchange program or form of engagement can offset this. As Marc
Lynch argues, “some conflicts and hatreds are real and cannot be talked away, but others are not
and dialogues may be helpful to determine which are which (quoted in Fitzpartick 2011, 39).
Success in U.S. foreign policy presupposes in-depth understanding of the world, recognizing its
cultural diversity, and engaging with people not only out of necessity, but as a part of standard
operating procedure. As Edward Murrow, the legendary reporter and former director of the U.S.
Information Agency who was tasked with communications after the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961,
put it, “[i]f they want me in on the crash landings, I better damn well be in on the take-offs”
(quoted in Lord 2008, 33).
In conclusion, public diplomacy has been an important element of U.S. foreign policy in
decades, and with the advent of the digital age, if anything, its importance has increased. Despite
the consensus about its overall effectiveness, the levels of funding and commitment to public
diplomacy – as well as its success in particular periods of time – have been subject to constant
fluctuations. In order to advance U.S. interests in the global era, those charged with making U.S.
public diplomacy need to demonstrate consistent commitment to listening and creating global
dialogue, but also an ability to understand and adapt to changing conditions in which public
diplomacy operates. Various questions about the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy in
certain circumstances and with certain publics remain. In order to get a better understanding of
the importance of the context, the next chapter is going to elaborate on the bilateral relationship
between the U.S. and Estonia, with a particular attention to the historical and cultural features in
creating the Estonian identity and framing the nature of its interactions with the world.
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Chapter 3: The Context for Soft Power: Estonia and the United States

For Estonia, once a member of not only the communist bloc, but the Soviet Union itself,
public diplomacy – particularly less benign forms in which states attempt to leverage their
influence – is nothing new. In the Cold War framework, Estonians were under heavy flow
propaganda by the Soviet regime, but also targeted by U.S. and other Western countries for
whom maintaining the ideas of freedom and democracy in everyday discourses of the Baltic
States was of strategic importance. The impact of the information campaigns of the two Cold
War superpowers on Estonians was markedly different. However, even with the demise of the
bipolar world system, it is clear that the broader political context sets the tone – and quite
directly – impacts any public diplomacy efforts. In order to get a better understanding of the
context in which the modern-day U.S. public diplomacy in Estonia operates, this chapter outlines
the key issues in the bilateral relationship between the United States and Estonia and makes
broader comments about Estonia’s geopolitical location, history, culture, and their role in
forming Estonians’ system of values and beliefs. Along Estonia’s way to integrating with the
West, the United States had a profound political and cultural impact and many of these
sentiments have carried over to the present day and to America’s engagement with its NATO
ally during the Obama administration.
Estonia: History, Culture, and Identity
“The frontier of the Republic of Estonia is more or less the same as it was in the
nineteenth century, the frontier between East and West”
(Jaan Kaplinski, quoted in Aalto 2013,15).
Estonia is bordered by Russia to the East, Latvia to the South, and Finland and Sweden
across the Baltic Sea. By the virtue of its unique strategic location, the country with a present
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population of about 1.3 million and an area slightly bigger than that of the state of Pennsylvania,
has often been seen as denoting something bigger.
Figure 1: Political Map of Northeastern Europe

Source:https://www.google.com/maps/place/Estonia/@56.3810989,12.2321288,4z/data=!4m2!3
m1!1s0x4692949c82a04bfd:0x40ea9fba4fb425c3

During the course of history, the Estonians have survived occupations by Swedes, Danes,
Germans, Russians, and the Soviet Union, and despite having been a NATO ally and a member
of the European Union (EU) for more than a decade, the Estonian people still have a strong
identification with their past. While most scholars maintain that Estonia has been an integral part
of (Western) Europe’s economic, political, cultural life at least since the Middle Ages (Kuus
2002, 97), its proximity to, and relations with, Russia have often made the country seen a lying
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on the separating line of what can broadly be described as Western and Orthodox culture.
Although lumping the three Baltic States together is a common practice and understandable in
terms of the geographical realities and Cold War dynamics – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were
all Soviet Republics – a common Baltic identity was essentially created by the Soviet regime
(CFR 1999). Estonia, the Northernmost of the Baltic countries, has always had strong Nordic
influences, most visibly shaped by the fact that Estonian is a Finno-Ugric rather than Baltic
language and much more similar to Finnish than Latvian and Lithuanian (Taagepera 2013, 93;
Kirch and Kirch 2001, 130-133, Ilves 1999). The idea that Estonians are culturally close to
northern Europeans and other Europeans who are fundamentally different from those in the East
is an important factor in explaining Estonians’ sense of belonging even today. These sentiments
are important; as Richard Mole put it, “no analysis of the history and politics of the Baltic States
is possible without a sound understanding of the role and power of identity” (2012, 1).
Independent Estonia and the Soviet Occupation
Estonia, as many other European countries, emerged in the wake of World War I, when
on February 24, 1918 Estonia declared independence. The U.S. recognized Estonia on July 28,
1922, and the first diplomatic mission opened in the same year. The period of independence was
ephemeral, and the relatively peaceful period of independence came to an abrupt end when,
according to Estonia, the U.S.’ and all other Western nations, Estonia was annexed by the Soviet
Union in 1940 (Mole 2012, 46). This distinction is important because up to this day, Moscow
asserts that there was nothing illegal about the actions of the USSR, and that Estonia was
incorporated voluntarily since the Soviet-dominated national assembly voted to join the Soviet
Union (Kramer 2002, 734; Bildt 1994). It was clear that Russia was not going to admit that the
country had occupied Estonia: after all, as Mole stated, it “would have tarnished what is held up

41

as one of the greatest chapters in Soviet and Russian history” (2012, 122; Raun 2001, 250). The
fact that the U.S. along with almost all other Western states did not recognize the de facto
annexation of the Baltic States, is a key principle underlying the bilateral relationship (Mole
2012, 47). A fact sheet outlined by the U.S Department of State emphasizes this point, arguing,
“[t]he United States never recognized the forcible incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union,
and views the present Government of Estonia as the legal continuation of the interwar republic”
(2014).
The economic, political, and moral toll that the 47-year period of Soviet occupation took
on Estonia was considerable (Raun 2001, 166; Mole 2012, 47). During the occupation, Estonia
was a separate Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) that had considerable control over its legislative
and executive issues within its boundaries, and it was also assigned its own national symbols,
like its own flag and national anthem. As Mole argues, this “myth of republican sovereignty”
was designed to “convince the non-Russian nations with their own SSR that they had already
attained the goal for which all national movements strive: a sovereign state” (2012, 54). In
comparison to several other Soviet Socialist Republics, the Baltic States had more autonomy and
this arrangement was helpful in retaining some of the Estonian-ness and Estonians’ sense of
belonging, but a great majority of Estonians were profoundly discontented with these
circumstances. In addition to their greater autonomy, the Baltic States were privileged in their
connections with the outside world: while Lithuania had strong connections with Poland and the
Catholic Church, Estonians had close links with Finns. In addition to Finnish visitors in Estonia,
the northern part of the country could watch Finnish television, which, as Raun put it, “provided
Estonians with a unique window on the West” (Mole 2012, 66; Raun 2001, 246). In many ways,
the Estonian government and people actively sought out ways to be informed about and maintain
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ties with the Western world. After all, the West provided not only a better alternative to the
widely detested communist regime, but helped retain the hope of achieving, or at least aspiring to,
a truly independent and democratic Estonia.
The decades under the Soviet regime varied in terms of the nature of the authoritarian
rule by the Communist Party. In the 1940s, the regime strengthened its grip on the country and
introduced campaigns of Sovietization and made Russian – a language completely unrelated to
Estonian – dominant in almost all spheres of life. While some Estonians vehemently refused to
learn or speak Russian, many eventually acquired the language, though in most cases, Estonian
was always spoken at homes (Taagepera 2013, 19). The regime tried to instill its guiding
principles in Estonians, but the rewriting of history and textbooks created even more resentment
and a situation when many children “learned two histories, one at school and one at home” (cited
in Mole 2012, 62; Conley and Gerber 2011, 15). Mass deportations in the 1940s created a
general environment of threat and anxiety among Estonians, and during the one in 1949, more
than twenty thousand people – about 3 percent of the Estonian population – were sent to
concentration camps in Siberia. As gruesome as these events were, one of their side effects was
that many Estonian elites who had not been exiled fled to the West, and instead of assimilating
into the local cultures, often became outspoken opponents of the Soviet regime.
Considerable Estonian communities formed in Sweden and the United States, and they
became crucial in maintaining Estonian culture and traditions by establishing Estonian societies
and organization, lobbying in the local governments, sending Western information to Estonia,
but perhaps most of all, keeping alive the dream of independent Estonia (Mole 2012, 5; Estonian
Embassy in Washington 2015). These contacts are often emphasized on the highest political
level, arguing that, “our warm relations are anchored by close interpersonal ties” (Joint
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Statement 2013). Perhaps the most remarkable instance of this is Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who
grew up in New Jersey in a family of Estonians émigrés and became a fervent opponent of the
Soviet regimes when he worked for the radio stations Voice of America and Radio Free Europe.
After Estonia regained its independence, he moved back to become Estonian foreign minister
and later on, the president (CRS Report 2007). By virtue of the United States never recognizing
the annexation, and their position remained that “the diplomatic relations continued
uninterrupted”, Estonian representatives were allowed to stay in the U.S. with diplomatic status,
which was of great significance during the occupation, as well as the re-independent Estonia
(Aalto 2003; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).
These unique connections put Estonia in a better position than many other nations who
were incorporated into the Soviet Union. The period of occupation consisted of both periods of
more stringent and relaxed political climate, and although the idea of an independent Estonia was
never forgotten, for many years, the prospects of its realization were dim. For Estonia and the
entire Soviet system, a real change came in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev, a leader much
different from his predecessors Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, was at the forefront
of guiding the USSR. By that time, Soviet Union’s glory days as a world superpower had
irreversibly ended, and Gorbachev’s initiatives such as perestroika and glasnost – aimed at
modernizing the political and economic system and mobilizing society – only gave momentum
to the developments that eventually led the communist system to collapse under its own weight
(Mole 2012, 67). In Estonia and various other Soviet Republics, Gorbachev’s policy actions were
crucial in generating “alternative visions of the future” and reconnecting with the West. The end
of the 1980s ushered in an era of national re-awakening in Estonia, and the creation of popular
movements produced a strong desire to withdraw from the union (Mole 2012, 67). Estonians’
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increasing desire for independence – and even more importantly – the belief that this was
attainable were combined by unforeseen weakness of the regime. Many believe it was
Gorbachev’s personal aversion to the use of military force that contributed to the USSR’s
somewhat unexpected strategy not to militarily crack down on nonviolent protestors in the
Baltics.
Estonia Regains its Independence
Despite the general sense of gratefulness that Estonians felt towards the West for its help
in both materially and morally supporting the forcefully occupied Baltic nations, there was
something unique about Estonia in regaining of its independence. While the Western values of
freedom, democracy, and rule of law were fundamentally important for Estonians, they always
had some reservations about the general ideas with regard to what became known as
Europeanization and standardization of Western popular culture. Pami Aalto argues that the
independence movement in Estonia, often referred to as the Singing Revolution, “was ultimately
about the survival of their language and culture, and thus, their identity” (2003, 118; Kirch and
Kirch 2001, 131). Of course, it was also an attempt to regain freedom, civil rights, and do away
with the Soviet economic mismanagement, but many Estonians saw that their identity was at
stake (Raun 2001, 222; Aalto 2003; Mole 2012, 70).
The rapid developments in the sphere of geopolitics and the domestic struggle in Estonia
culminated on August 20, 1991, when Estonia declared full independence. In early September of
the same year, Estonia was recognized by the United States and admitted to the United Nations
(Raun 2001, 224; Bildt 1994; Taagepera 2013, 97). Again, the Estonian government took the
position that the Soviet occupation – as well as all the rules from it – were unlawful and insisted
seeing Estonia as a restored rather than new state (Mole 2012, 88). The adherence to the
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historical continuity discourse was an important factor in simplifying many of the reform efforts,
but first and foremost, it was a moral argument that gave substance to the idea that in terms of its
culture and value system, Estonia had always been part of the democratic world (Mole 2012, 81;
Raun 2001, 246). This idea was reinforced when, for instance, the declaration with which the
European Community recognized the independence of the Baltic States, stated: “the time had
come for Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to occupy their rightful place among the peoples of
Europe” (quoted in More 2012, 79). In August 1994, the last Russian troops left Estonia, and the
Estonian President Lennart Meri announced that “the saddest chapter in Estonian history has
come to an end” and “Estonia is again part of Europe and of the Western world” (emphasis
added, quoted in Mole 2012, 128). Despite the daunting task of rebuilding the democratic
institutions and constitutional structure, transitioning to a free-market system, and becoming a
true liberal democracy, Estonians were optimistic and determined (Mole 2012, 104). Building on
its close relations with its neighbors Finland and Sweden, as well as support from the United
States, Estonia was at the forefront of the economic and political reform. Institutionally and
societally, however, the direct impact of the U.S. on Estonia was smaller than that of Sweden and
Finland (Kaljurand, personal communication).
Despite the tolerable, and at times even cooperative, relations with the newly emerged
Russian Federation, the concern about Estonian security was always present. The indirect
military pressure and attempts to protect its compatriots in Estonia created a great deal of unease
(Kramer 2002, 734). The fact that Russia’s special rights in its “near abroad” became a central
element of Moscow’s rhetoric throughout the 1990s reignited the fear that history could repeat
itself (Kramer 2002, 735; Aalto 2003, 23). After all, there were more than twenty-five million
Russians continuing to live outside of the borders of the Russian Federation. The changes in
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Estonian ethnic breakdown had been remarkable: when in 1939, the share of Estonians in their
home country was 92 percent; in 1989 this figure stood at 61.5 percent (Taagepera 2013, 97),
representing the thousands of Russians who came to the Western and relatively more well-off
part of the enormous union. For instance, while in the Estonian city of Narva, right by the
Russian border in Eastern Estonia, Estonians had long stood at 95 percent of the population and
the share of Russians was approximately five percent, by the late 1980s, these numbers reversed
(Raun 2001, 205-206; Bildt 1994). Although in the referendum that took place in March 1991,
the idea of an independent Estonia was supported even by many non-Estonians who lived in the
country (Mole 2012, 76), the rhetoric “forced Estonians to perceive Russian speakers as a threat
to independent Estonia” (Mole 2012, 83-84).
In these circumstances, the need for constructing a European identity – one that traced
Estonians’ cultural and ethnic genesis and stood in stark opposition to the Russian other –only
increased (Mole 2012, 144). Along the lines of Banerjee’s idea that “several elements of national
identity are structured in oppositions”, distinguishing between the “Estonian ‘self’ and Russian
‘other’” became a central feature of the nation-building process in the early days of the
independence (Aalto 2003, 30; Kuus 2002, 97; Kärner 2000). It was clear that Russia as a
neighbor could not be wished away and that Moscow was not going to admit that the country had
occupied Estonia, but Estonians were resilient in maintaining that Russia had not had any special
rights in the Baltics (Raun 2001, 251; Mole 2012, 122). This struggle had profound ramifications
beyond Estonia’s borders and, at times quite explicitly, became an issue for the United States.
The Post-Cold War Period: Estonia’s Engagement with the West
In many parts of the West, particularly in those where Estonian émigré communities had
been influential, there was an understanding that even though the Baltic States are marginal in
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size and population, they represent something much bigger in the post-Cold War world (Coffey
2013, 2). In 1994, then Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt argued in his Foreign Affairs article
“The Baltic Litmus Test” that the security concerns of the Baltic states were to “test the readiness
and ability of the United States to influence Russian policy and contribute to the new security
order in Central and Eastern Europe” (1994). In light of the complications in Balkans, Bildt
framed the case of the Baltics as an opportunity to prove the West’s credibility. A somewhat
similar argument is made by Agnia Grigas, who considered the Baltic States as “primary
indicator of whether or not Russia was willing to abandon its imperialist ambitions and cooperate
in the New World Order and its system of norms and institutions” (2012, 22). For the
government and people of Estonia and its Baltic neighbors, the accession to the European Union
(EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) quickly became a top national security
and foreign policy objective. This goal was not to be achieved easily, but the stakes were
extremely high; as Maria Mälksoo argues, “The quest of the Baltic States for membership in the
EU and NATO has been politics of survival par excellence, aimed at securing Western security
guarantees against historically aggressive and unstable neighboring Russia” (2006, 277).
Political engagement with the West
Estonians’ European identity and support for values like freedom and democracy was
generally unquestioned by other Westerners even immediately after the country regained its
independence in 1991. However, in most instances, the moral backing did not readily translate
into political support, mostly due to the fear of aggravating the Russian bear. In the mid-1990s,
Estonia’s closest supporters were the Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden and Denmark,
with the United States as an important NATO power following their lead (Library of Congress).
Although Estonia became a participant in the NATO Partnership for Peace program in 1993, the
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support for any propositions with regard to the accession to NATO had significant limits, most
likely due to the fact that in the same year, Moscow made it clear that “the expansion of military
alliances to Russian borders would be considered a threat to its national interests” (Mole 2012,
149). In 1997, when former Soviet Satellites Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were
invited to join NATO, the Baltic States were left in the sidelines as they were not seen as an
“area of vital strategic interest” (Asmus and Nurick 1996, Mole 2012, 149; Kramer 2002, 747).
The idea of limiting the accession to these three countries was supported by President Clinton,
who was among politicians who thought that since the Baltic States lagged behind in terms of
military capabilities and indicators of societal development, they were simply not ready to join
the security alliance (Kramer 2002, 737). Some argued that due to their geopolitical location,
Baltic States were “militarily indefensible”, while their opponents insisted not defending the
Baltic States was going to create instability in the region and create severe security concerns for
Europe and the U.S. (Kramer 2002, 750). While the fear of aggravating Russia was
understandable, there were those who argued that giving Russia “a de-facto veto over NATO
membership” was fundamentally problematic and therefore accepting Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania to the alliance was a strategic interest as well as a moral obligation for the Western
powers (Kramer 2002, 747).
Outlined by the Clinton administration, the Baltic Action Plan of 1996 substantiated the
cooperation between the United States and the Baltics. In 1997, the rhetorical support from the
new U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright and her assurance that after the accession of
Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, NATO will expand again, was an important indication
that the Baltics were moving in the right direction. In her speech in Lithuania, Secretary Albright
further argued that America’s goal was to “create a new pattern of politics in Europe” and
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maintained that “no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map”
(Albright 1997), speaking directly to the fear that Russia’s proximity would strip the Baltics
from the membership. The United States further consolidated its relations with the three Baltic
States when the 1998 Baltic Charter of Partnership created a framework for multidimensional
cooperation with the U.S. The document was not to be seen an unequivocal confirmation of the
prospects of NATO membership, but sent a strong message about America’s support for the
region (Talbott 1998; Kramer 2002, 741). Specifically, the first principle of the partnership,
“[t]he United States of America has a real, profound, and enduring interest in the independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania” (Charter 1998) is
an indication of the Clinton administration’s desire to help the Baltic States to NATO. However,
for many other players – including NATO senior officials in other NATO member states as well
as in U.S. Congress – at that time, the costs of the Baltics’ membership outweighed the benefits
(Council of Foreign Relations, 1999).
The relatively hesitant attitude from the Bush administration turned into a strong – and
bipartisan – endorsement of the Baltic States’ aspirations, and the question became what was the
specific timeline. In his speech in Warsaw in June 2001, President Bush made a strong argument
in support for NATO expansion and argued that what George H. W. Bush had called a Europe
“whole and free” was “no longer a dream, […] but rising around us” (Bush 2001). Bush’s idea
that all European democracies from the Baltic to the Black Sea had the same right for freedom,
security and “the same chance to join the institutions of Europe as Europe’s old democracies”
resonated in the Baltics (Bush 2001). A few months later, the terrorist attacks of 9/11
fundamentally transformed many preexisting conventions about U.S. national security and its
relations with the world. Despite sharp differences with regard to the Bush administration’s
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invasion of Iraq, as then Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, reminds in
his book, the support for Baltics’ aspirations was bipartisan and almost universal (Laanemae,
personal commmunication). In addition to this, as Kramer argues, even though Russia was still
against the accession of the Baltic States, in 2002 it became apparent that Moscow was “not
willing to risk its relations with the West for it” (2002, 748). With a decisive role played by the
United States, Estonia’s – along with its Baltic members and four Central European countries –
accession to NATO became a reality in 2004 (Aalto 2003, 49; Mole 2012, 163).
Cultural engagement with the West
In addition to promising to help Estonians work towards NATO, the United States
persistently advocated for Estonia’s deeper integration with Europe and eventually joining the
EU. Multidimensional integration was one of the central features of the 1998 Baltic Charter, and
in the words of Marina Kaljurand, former Estonian Ambassador to the U.S., “it was in
Americans’ interests to make sure Estonia was culturally engaging with the EU to make sure the
country was not left alone even if the NATO bid was not to work out (Kaljurand, personal
communication; Baltic Charter; CFR 1999). As it turned out, Estonia became a member of
NATO a few weeks before it entered the European Union in spring 2004.
In many ways, Estonia’s accession to the two crucially important organizations was very
different. Estonians never doubted their European identity, the country applied for the EU in
1995 and became a candidate for the membership in 1997, but as opposed to the almost universal
support for NATO among native Estonians, increasingly many had doubts about the sensibility
of joining the union (Raun 2001, 259). Declining cultural independence, concern over the
preservation of the Estonian language, and the understanding that the accession was not to come
easily made many reconsider the sensibility of joining an increasingly unified union after having
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fought to leave another (Kirch and Kirch 2001, 136; Aalto 2003, 66). Estonians were concerned
about Western Europeans’ perception of them as its “less civilized, more barbaric, other half”
and fearful of being seen as a marginalized post-communist state in European periphery (Mole
2012, 154; Kirch and Kirch 2001, 135; Vetik 2003, nr 46). Estonian society as a whole was
considerably more skeptical about the EU than the government and most of the elite. The
governing elite rejected the idea that joining the European Union would result in the weakening
in Estonian cultural identity and made a convincing case that it was fundamentally different from
the one that the Soviets created and sustained (Mole 2012, 159). In the run-up for the 2003
referendum of joining the EU, the “yes” campaign managed to frame the debate as an “inevitable
historical choice between West and East” (Mikkel and Pridham 2004, 737) and emphasized the
prospect of peaceful coexistence of Estonian and European identity. The 66.8 percent support
was not a particularly close call, but nevertheless the lowest among the ten countries – a
tendency that can be explained by Estonians’ particular concern over preserving their culture,
language, and political independence (Mole 2012, 162).
Although there was some skepticism about U.S. actions in the years following 9/11, the
Bush era in Estonian foreign policy was driven by sense of gratefulness for America’s help with
Estonia’s pursuit of NATO and the EU, and a determination to give back to the alliance.
Estonian troops fought in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the face of the growing tensions between
the U.S. and its European allies, Estonian politicians were persistent in finding what bound rather
than separated the two sides of the Atlantic (Marmei 2004). As Sven Mikser put it, the notion of
America’s imperial overstretch did not go unnoticed, but for Estonia, bigger concern, to use
Richard Haass’ notion, was always “U.S.’ imperial understretch” (2003). By and large, the
Estonian public agreed with the rhetoric advanced by Estonian government and foreign policy
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community. However, a certain level of discomfort with the potential impact of U.S.’ cultural
dominance on the Estonian identity had always been present, and during the Bush years it
persisted, and perhaps even strengthened. While the opening of borders and increasing easiness
of travelling were generally seen as positive developments, some were concerned about the
survival of the Estonian language in a world where English was the lingua franca, and saw any
signs of Europeanization, or even worse, Americanization, as negative.
Once again, the support for basic U.S. policies still remained relatively high. When
President Bush visited Estonia in 2006 and praised the country for its successful economic and
political transformation, but voiced some criticism about Estonia’s unsuccessful integration
policies, particularly in regard to poorly integrated Russians, more than ten percent of whom
(130,000 people) at that time were stateless and able to receive Estonian citizenship only when
they passed tests of Estonian language and history (Epstein 2004; Grigas 2012, 22). Over the
past decade, the problem with Estonian residence of undetermined citizenship has decreased, but
not disappeared. Despite otherwise relatively cooperative relations with Russia, in 2007 the
bilateral relationship reached its low point with the controversy over moving the Bronze Soldier,
a World War II-era statue that used to be in Tallinn’s city center. The conflict initiated not only
harsh verbal attacks from Moscow, but violent protests in Tallinn and Estonian Embassy in
Moscow, as well as cyber-attacks on Estonian government servers.
The U.S.-Estonian Bilateral Relationship During the Obama Administration
Estonia has gained enormously from the post-Cold War security architecture and
America’s commitment to the region, and in 2009 President Obama was faced with a completely
different Estonia than that greeted by George W. Bush eight years earlier. The U.S. has always
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been one of the most vocal proponents of Estonia’s success in democratic and economic
transition (Ilves 2012). According to U.S. government accounts:
Since 1991, Estonia has undergone a tremendous transformation. Through
hard work, innovation, and a pursuit of strong democratic ideals, enhanced
security, and greater cooperation, Estonia has emerged as an example to the
region and the world. The country’s integration of technology into public and
private partnerships demonstrates the endless possibilities that technology can
have when harnessed to benefit societies. Estonia is an effective and reliable
trans-Atlantic partner in advancing peace, stability, and democracy in Europe and
beyond. Its cooperation with the region has made it an invaluable ally in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States appreciates Estonia’s
commitment to the shared mission in Afghanistan.
(U.S. Department of State 2014).
Given its tough experiences with the Soviet occupation, Estonia has been praised for its liberal
democracy, rule of law, relative economic prosperity, and technological innovations ranging
from e-governance solutions to developing software for Skype (Coffey 2013, 22). At the same
time, the country is far from having entirely offset the impact of half a century of repression and
economic mismanagement, and catching up with its neighbors in Scandinavia in terms of human
development, unemployment, poverty rates, GDP per capita, will take decades. Prominent
Estonian social scientist Marju Lauristin talks about “social contradictions shadowing Estonia’s
success story” and makes a convincing case that even though Estonia’s membership of NATO
and the EU has increased its international position significantly, life in Estonia has not become
significantly better for an ordinary citizen (2000, 614).
In addition to that, Estonia continues to receive international criticism for its poor success
with integrating its Russian community, making up 24.8 percent of the population (Grigas 2012,
22). A 2011 report on Russian compatriot policy in Estonia by the Center for Strategic and
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International Studies (CSIS) argues that poor integration is one of the main reasons why Russia
“excels in its dissemination of soft propaganda” and is “successful in informing the views of
compatriots on issues like history and politics” (Conley and Gerber 2011). To be sure, there is
nothing wrong with countries using soft power and channels of public diplomacy. The problem
in this case is that Russia’s manner of pursuing its interests in Estonia has strong elements of
propaganda, and it impinges upon important areas of Estonian national sovereignty and
undermines its core interests (Grigas 2012, 22). Nonetheless, many Estonians have become used
to indirect pressure from Russia.
Driven by the idea of normalization in the Baltic region and President Obama’s relative
disengagement with Europe, during his first term in office, President Obama, “much to the
disappointment of Baltic officials”, did not host his Baltic counterparts at the White House
(Coffey 2013, 3). The two countries still enjoyed excellent relations, and as Estonian government
officials argue, from the Estonian standpoint, the political party of the U.S. President has never
made much difference. In this sense, although the approval ratings of President Obama were
considerably higher than that of George W. Bush towards the end his second term, the widely
acclaimed “Obama effect” was of less importance than in Western Europe. During the first term
of the Obama administration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her commitment to the
region dominated (Laanemäe, personal communication).
Few believed that the circumstances could change so profoundly and quickly, and that in
September 2014, together with 150 American troops stationed in Estonia, President Obama
would be in Tallinn to give what David Frum in the Atlantic labeled “the most important speech
about European security of the post-Cold War era” (Frum 2014). For many, Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine signified the end of the relatively peaceful time period, and just like in the 1990s,
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many saw the Baltics as the test case for the U.S. administration. In Tallinn, 200 kilometers from
the Russian border and 1000 from Moscow, as Mrs. Kaljurand, former Estonian Ambassador in
the U.S., emphasized in personal communication, President Obama made it clear that “NATO
Article 5 is crystal clear: an attack on one is an attack on all” and that although Estonia had lost
its independence before, “With NATO, [Estonia] will never lose it again” (The White House
2014b). Mrs. Kaljurand, an Estonian ambassador in Washington, DC in 2011-2014 argued that
she had been given these promises behind closed doors, but that seeing the President deliver this
live to Estonian people was something out of the ordinary (Kaljurand, personal communication).
In his speech, President Obama swiftly rejected any talk of spheres of influence, and claimed that
the Baltics are not “post-Soviet territory” but independent nations (The White House 2014b).
What makes President Obama’s speech is Tallinn particularly relevant for this study, is
the abundance of cultural and historical references in the speech and his ability to speak to the
sensibilities of Estonians. The numerous references to Estonian culture and history included one
about Estonian traditional and widely popular song festival, with President Obama stating, “My
only regret is that I missed this summer’s Laulupidu. And I’ll try to come back next time and
catch it,” (The White House 2014b). His mentioning of Estonian poetess Marie Under and Heinz
Valk, a legendary Estonian politician from the 1990s, resonated with the Estonian public, and he
was largely seen as genuine and humble. In particular, during a press conference with Estonian
President Ilves, President Obama praised Estonia for its e-government solutions and claimed “I
should have called the Estonians when we were setting up our health care website”, leaving an
impression of a humble and relatable person with a good sense of humor (The White House
2014a).
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President Obama’s speech in Tallinn is not only a great way to understand the current
frame of the U.S.-Estonian bilateral relationship, but it also sends broader messages about how
acquiring in-depth country expertise and understanding the local context and way of life are
crucial for effective public diplomacy. While it is difficult and time-consuming, the efforts pay
off in a context of a relationship often marked by the word excellent.
In conclusion, U.S. public diplomacy in Estonia is heavily impacted by the nature of the
bilateral relationship between the two countries. The relationship itself is built on shared values
and people-to-people contacts as much as it is founded on coinciding geopolitical interests in the
Baltic Sea region. Estonians are a nation whose beliefs and values are strongly shaped by its
history and culture; and identity and security are closely linked. In conducting public diplomacy
in Estonia, the nation’s two goals of international integration, and at the same time the protection
of its national identity from foreign influence, must be taken into account (Kuus 2002, 26; Aalto
2003, 121; Kärner 2000). In other words, the common quest for the protection of the Estonian
language and culture may limit the ability of any actor to influence the deep-rooted belief system
of Estonians.
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Chapter 4: People-to-People Contact and U.S. government-sponsored
Exchange Programs
The first chapters of this study have argued that the promise of soft power and public
diplomacy cannot be understood without having a deep knowledge about the context in which
public diplomacy – be it in the form of one-way messaging, high-level speeches, or exchange
programs – takes place. The discussions about the nature of American public diplomacy and the
nature of U.S.- Estonian relationship are important, but not sufficient for assessing the impact of
the U.S. government-sponsored Fulbright program on the beliefs of Estonian participants. The
final step before considering the original survey data is understanding the reasons for which
genuine dialogue rather than one-way messaging is considered the most profound form of public
diplomacy promise of exchange programs, but also the continuing debate over the effectiveness
of the programs.
The Role of Cultural and Educational Exchange Programs in U.S. Public Diplomacy
In the history of U.S. foreign policy, various administrations’ commitment to public
diplomacy has fluctuated depending both on the international circumstances and domestic
priorities. Exchange programs that are designed to create genuine dialogue and create mutual
understanding have proved some of the more resilient elements of U.S. public diplomacy. After
all, it was already forty years ago when a U.S. Congressional report, “The Future of U.S. Public
Diplomacy” warned that: “More communication does not by itself guarantee better
communication. In most instances, it merely multiplies the possibilities for misunderstandings
and misinterpretation” (quoted in Snow 2009, 9). When it comes to acquiring in-depth
knowledge and creating lasting relationships, cultural and education exchanges hold the most
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promise for winning hearts and minds for the U.S. As Gregory argues, long-term engagement
“places a premium on dialogue, reasoned argument, openness to the opinions of others, learning
through questions, and not talking at cross purposes (2011, 357). At the same time, exchanges
are the only type of public diplomacy initiatives that “directly involve the ‘human factor’” and
directly deal with participants personalities and psychologies, which includes considerable risk
(Scott-Smith 2009, 50). In addition to that, the nature of the exchange programs often makes
them difficult to manage, and the direct benefits, if any, can be expected to emerge only over the
long term.
The network of the official exchange programs sponsored by the U.S. Department of State is
one of the most advanced and prestigious, and the State Department and its partner agencies have
over the decades provided “considerable anecdotal evidence indicating the favorable outcomes
that these activities have generated” (Scott-Smith 2008, 174; Mueller 2006, 63; Snow 2009, 5;
Riordan 2005, 180). The basic justifications behind the practice of U.S. government-sponsored
exchanges have remained the largely same since 1973 when the State Departments’ Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs outlined the basic goals for its exchange programs as follows:


To favorably influence the environment within which US foreign policy is carried out;



To enlarge the circle of those able to serve as influential interpreters between this and
other nations;



To help current and potential opinion leaders and decision makers to gain through firsthand experience more accurate perceptions and a deeper understanding of these realities
in each others’ societies which ultimately tend to affect international relations.”
(Quoted in Mueller 1986, 4)
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The idea that creating mutual understanding and greater appreciation for different points
of view drive the exchange programs even today. Interpersonal communication is the most
important opportunity to build trust, and understanding (Snow 2009, 5; Scott-Smith 2008, 176).
The Fulbright Program, one of the most prestigious among the exchange programs, was
founded in 1946 and has had approximately 310,000 participants since that time. Senator
William Fulbright was a dedicated educator and remained the face and unofficial spokesman for
U.S. government-sponsored exchanges for almost fifty years prior to his death in 1995 (Snow
2008, 214). Senator Fulbright was committed to education and expanding mutual understanding,
and believed that “in the long course of history, having people who understand your thought is
much greater security than another submarine” (quoted in Cowan and Arsenault 2008, 19).
During the Cold War, the Fulbright Program was seen as a Trojan horse that contributed to the
eventual collapse of the communist system, and also gave Americans a better understanding of
what life on the other side of the Iron Curtain was like (Nye 2004). Especially in its early days, a
major benefit from the Fulbright Program was its promotion of American studies and their
incorporation into the curricula of universities and schools outside of the U.S.. In the 1950s,
Fulbright was also a part of the effort of establishing jointly run U.S-Spanish military air bases
(Scott-Smith 2008, 181). While the focus of the Fulbright Program thereafter narrowed, its
appeal did not, and the program gained popularity. Today, The Fulbright Program consists of the
Fulbright Student, Fulbright Scholar, and various other subprograms that operate in more than
160 countries and attract thousands of American and non-U.S. students and academics to apply
for the highly competitive program and spend a year or a semester abroad.
Gregory argues that much of the academic literature presents increasing number of
exchanges as “a signature recommendation” for U.S. public diplomacy during the Obama
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administration, and that “No foreign visit of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton takes place
without at least one reference to the importance of expanding educational exchanges” (Gregory
2011, 357; Scott-Smith 2008, 176). The National Security Strategy of 2010 likewise emphasizes
the importance of people-to-people contact: “Time and again, we have seen that the best
ambassadors for American values and interests are the American people – our businesses,
nongovernmental organizations, scientists, athletes, artists, military service members, students”
(The White House 2010, 12). President Obama made a reference to his commitment of
increasing exchanges in his renowned Cairo speech, making it even more personal by saying “we
will expand exchange programs, and increase scholarships, like the one that brought my father to
America” (The White House 2009a). A fact sheet outlined by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
explains that State Department’s goal is to help create an environment receptive to U.S. national
interests, and argues that exchanges help advances U.S. national interests by fostering a sense of
common interests and common values. For the State Department, offering visitors firsthand
experiences to American society and culture are as important as the opportunity for Americans to
learn about other countries and peoples (U.S. Department of State 2010).
The Debate about Exchanges
Although exchange programs have been a part of U.S. public diplomacy efforts for
decades, there has been considerable debate about their real impact and usefulness. Several highlevel foreign service officers like former Secretary of State, Colin Powell, have been steadfast
believers in the exchanges, arguing, “I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than
the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here” (U.S. Department of State,
2001). At the same time, coalitions or individual members of Congress, particularly those most
concerned with balancing the budget and appealing to their domestic constituencies, have not
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shared this view. The basic political problem with exchanges is that it is really hard to measure
their impact and observations taken within any one country during a specific time period are
likely to be dependent on different factors specific to this country (Atkinson 2010, 8; Scott-Smith
2012). There is a host of variables involved, but several comparative studies, like the one
Atkinson conducted from 1980-2006, concluded that U.S.-hosted educational exchange
programs played an important role in supporting the development of liberal values and practices,
particularly in authoritarian states (2010, 19).
By and large, the critics of U.S. government-sponsored exchange programs are split into
two groups. The first set of critics argue that spending precious resources on the programs is not
reasonable. They point to the fact that the U.S. with its diverse and high-level higher education
has attracted students from around the world for decades, as the number of international students
studying in the U.S. has grown steadily since the 1970s. In 2013/14, the number of international
students in the U.S. stood at 8.1 percent and meant a record high of 886,052 students; that is 4.2
percent of the total number of people enrolled in U.S. institutions of higher education (Open
Doors Fast Facts 2014). The critics claim that international students, as opposed to the ones who
are granted scholarships form the Department of State bring money to the U.S. and thereby help
U.S. economy, rather than being an additional burden for the already troubled federal budget.
The second set of critics simply do not accept what they see as Senator Fulbright’s
idealistic idea that “exchange makes us better human beings” (Snow 2008, 214). Senator
Fulbright stresses “the need for people to understand, though not necessarily agree with, a
nation’s position” and for its critics, this speaks to the weakness of the exchange programs
(original emphasis, Cowan and Arsenault 2008, 19). It is true that the Cold War approach to
exchanges was “not a one-sided altruistic mission” and most participants knew that the U.S.
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government’s commitment to exchange and international education was politically motivated,
and all exchanges – even if presented as educational apolitical – operate within the broader
political environment (Snow 2008, 215; Scott-Smith 2009, 50). Scott-Smith is right that “the
potential political reward from creating a situation whereby individuals may reconsider their
identity, and so their interests, is obvious”, but it is increasingly apparent that expecting the
exchanges to produce tangible political benefit is impractical (2008, 184). In fact, great effort has
been made over the years to maintain the Fulbright Program’s distance from political objectives,
since it is believed to undermine the authenticity of the exchange (Scott-Smith 2008, 180). Even
during the Cold War, American Fulbrighters were “not expected to speak out in favor of U.S.
foreign policy actions”, as this was believed to create more obstruction than attraction. Even
during the Cold War, the exchanges were not seen as a retaliatory propositions, and throughout
the Cold War, participants on U.S. government-sponsored exchange programs were “pleasantly
surprised to find that there was no obligation to comply with U.S. interests in return” (ScottSmith 2011, 9).
The idea that government’s excessive activity in the field of cultural relations undermines
the value and authenticity of these interactions is particularly true in the context of the global
information age, where most democratic governments have realized that even an attempt to
control the message and people-to-people interactions is be wrong, and that their task is to
“encourage the free flow of discourse, public argument, and engagement across boundaries
(Gregory 2011a, 797, Nye). For this reason, there has been an increasing attempt by the U.S.
government to partner with independent actors like non-governmental organizations, businesses,
and individuals, to initiate exchange programs, increase understanding which may lead to diffuse
political effects (Rupp 1999). Senator Fulbright has claimed that instead of trying to improve the
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image of the U.S. “the value of exchanges is in the opportunity for expansion of knowledge,
wisdom, and empathy” (Snow 2008, 209). There is quite large body of work on the impact that
direct experience of another culture can have on a participant’s belief system and psychological
outlook (Scott-Smith 2009, 54). As Wiarda argues,
There is no substitute for being there, learning the language, soaking up the
culture, living as the people do. Only then you start to understand what their
perspectives and issues are. […]You need to soak up the culture and the ambiance.
You have got to see it first-hand. […]You’ve got to speak the local language, do
you own interviews in their language and not yours, understand the culture form
your subjects’ point-of-view and not just through your own rose-colored glasses,
which is our definition of ethnocentrism. I call this approach empathy – the ability
to place yourself in the shoes of your subject (2013, 12-13).
Wiarda among others believes that living across cultures has the potential to change the way
exchangees see not only their host country, but the world, their home country, and themselves,
potentially becoming more open and challenging their preexisting assumptions (Geiger 2010, 98).
As a corollary, the Fulbrighters, most of whom are active and influential in their local
communities, are expected to share their experiences and broaden the understanding of people in
their communities. Cowan and Arsenault argue that the exchanges should be seen as an
opportunity to win an argument or change someone’s outlook. The authors praise exchanges for
their potential to create “instances of collaboration” through projects, networks and partnerships,
arguing “[n]othing helps build mutual understanding as well as a thoughtful dialogue. And
nothing creates a sense of trust and mutual respect as fully as meaningful collaboration (2008,
27). The mutual understanding and sense of trust is often translated into long-lasting personal
friendships that bind people together and create transnational networks that, many believe, have
the most potential to challenge today’s complex problems (Scott-Smith 2010, 172; Slaughter
2010, Snow 2008). Nevertheless, the political debate over the funding on exchange programs is
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ongoing; and although the amount of money channeled into exchange programs is marginal in
comparison with America’s defense expenses, the funding for programs is constantly at the risk
of being cut.
People-to-People Contact between the U.S. and Estonia
The importance of people-to-people contacts in the bilateral relationship of the United
States and Estonia dates back to Estonian émigrés who relocated to the U.S. during World War II
and played a crucial role in Estonia regaining its independence. Later on, contacts have been
built through travelling, business, different exchange programs, and students in U.S. universities.
In 2013-2014, 212 Estonians studied full-time at U.S. universities, as a percentage of population
higher than that of Germany, France, and the UK (Open Doors 2014). To provide information
and assist international students who are interested in attending U.S. colleges and universities,
the U.S. Department of State sponsors the network of Education USA offices: two of the total
400 of which are in Estonia. The office maintains presence in social media and sends newsletters
about scholarship options. The office attracts considerable attention, though the high cost of U.S.
college programs is a hurdle for many Estonians, especially given the many much less costly
alternatives in Europe (Epp Kirss, pers. comm.).
Running the U.S. government-sponsored exchange programs is one of the most important
ways in which the U.S. Embassy in Tallinn encourages people-to-people contact between
Estonians and Americans. The Fulbright program, widely considered the most prestigious of the
exchange programs, started in Estonia in 1991 and has an Estonian alumni network of nearly 100
people. Interest for the program has been significant and quite constant, and the Fulbright
Student and Fulbright Scholar Programs continue to attract the best and the brightest from
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Estonian universities (Hurst, pers. comm.). One of the program’s most prominent Estonian
alumni of the program is Marina Kaljurand, currently an Under Secretary for Political Affairs at
the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Estonian ambassador to Russia from 2006-2008
and the United States from 2011 to 2014. Mrs. Kaljurand, who used the Fulbright grant to attend
a Master’s program in International Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy at
Tufts University, looks back to her exchange experience with great gratitude. Mrs. Kaljurand
admits it was “an extraordinary experience” and suggested “a lot of schoolwork” was the first
thing that came to her mind when she was asked to think back to her year in the U.S. In addition
to that, she mentioned excellent networking opportunities and an expansion of her worldview,
and claimed that she continues to benefit from her Fulbright experience even today (Kaljurand,
personal communication).
To sum up the debate over the exchange programs and the enduring people-to-people
contacts between the United States and Estonia, it is clear that creating genuine dialogue with
people from other countries has the potential to produce mutual understanding and build trust.
This is by no means the only possible outcome of different forms of intercultural communication
as this may result in differences, but particularly in a context in which the two countries and
cultures are similar, there are various opportunities for constructive collaboration and mutual
self-enrichment.
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Chapter 5: The Impact of the Fulbright Program on the Beliefs of
Estonians

After in-depth exploration of soft power, public diplomacy and the context of U.S.Estonian bilateral relationship, this study moves to consider the original survey data to assess the
impact of U.S. government-sponsored Fulbright Student and Fulbright Scholar exchange
programs on Estonian participants’ beliefs about the United States and its role in the world.
Designed as a holistic single-case study, it pays particular attention to the underlying historical,
cultural, and political factor, and adds to the existing body of research done on the impact of
public diplomacy programs. The case study relies on multiple sources of evidence:
Comprehensive surveys and open-ended interviews were used in combination with documents,
archival records, and direct observation. Besides its interesting history, culture, and continuing
geopolitical relevance, the smallness of the country made it possible reach out to all of the 35
Estonians who participated in the Fulbright program since 2009.
From January 10 to March 11, 2015, two online surveys were conducted using Qualtrics
software. The first questionnaire (Appendix 1: Online Survey for Fulbright Participants) was sent
to all 35 Estonian participants of the Fulbright Student and Fulbright Scholar Programs from the
years 2009-2014. All of the contact information was obtained from the U.S. Embassy in Tallinn.
The second survey was similar, though not identical to the first one, and was sent to a group of
Estonian students and scholars who had not taken part in any U.S. government-sponsored
exchange programs. The control group was created to allow for the comparison of the responses
of the Fulbright participants with Estonians who were of similar backgrounds, but who had not
taken part of U.S. government-sponsored exchange programs. In order to qualify for the control
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group, a candidate needed to be at least in the process of obtaining a Master’s degree, though
PhD holders were specifically targeted. Most of the contact information of the control group was
gathered from the Estonian Research Portal (Eesti Teadusportaal, https://www.etis.ee), which
lists Estonian scholars and academics.
Table 3: Survey Characteristics

Fulbright
Program
Participants
Control
Group (nonFulbrighters)

Total
number of
surveys
sent out

Completed
surveys

Rate of
Response

Male

Female

Master’s
Degrees

PhD

35

26

74.3%

11

14

8

18

125

54

43%

25

29

31

23

More than 98 percent of the respondents of both groups identified themselves as Estonians, with
one Fulbrighter and one member of the control group identifying themselves as Russian. The
overwhelming majority of the people were either from Tartu or Tallinn or had studied in either of
these Estonian cities. While the level of education of the people in the two groups was essentially
equal, there was some variation in the age of the respondents. On average, Fulbright participants
were slightly older than students and scholars from the control group, when 70 percent of the
members of the control group and 58 percent of the Fulbrighters were twenty-three to thirty
years old, 25 percent Fulbrighters more than 35, 12 among control group. A slight difference was
also in the field of study of the two groups. While among Fulbrighters, law, economics,
engineering, and computer science were the most frequent areas of study, in the control group,
health, education, chemistry and geography dominated.

68

When it comes to the Estonian Fulbright participants, the 74.3 percent participation rate
provides a solid basis for outlining tendencies about them as a group, and the slight differences
in the backgrounds of members of the two groups do not prevent me from making comparisons
and forming an overall judgment about the impact of U.S. public diplomacy in Estonia. However,
it is important to note that the data from the surveys targets a very specific and narrow segment
of the Estonian society and therefore making generalizations about the whole Estonian
population based on the results of this study is not viable. At the same time, the segment of the
society that the programs are targeting is far from inconsequential – as candidates for being the
future political and societal leaders, Fulbrighters as highly educated and socially active young
people are expected to have an influence that extends far beyond their persona and family.
The online survey sent to Estonian Fulbright participants and the control group consisted
of three main topics: the first section dealt with their general beliefs and outlook of international
relations, the second asked them to elaborate on the nature of the U.S.-Estonian bilateral
relationship, and the third was designed to get a better understanding of their views towards
exchange programs. The results of the research project were analyzed using quantitative and
qualitative methods, and this next chapter presents the most relevant data in the form of graphs,
tables, or direct quotations. In order to get an overview of the differences of the positions of the
two groups, their responses to selected Likert-scale questions are presented in twofold tables.
Any quotations that appear in the chapter are presented in their original form, including spelling,
grammar, and punctuation.
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General Beliefs
The first set of questions was aimed at getting a better understanding of the background
of the respondents, their previous connections with the United States, and their general interest in
international affairs.
Note: The table outlines the mean of their responses to the following statements, where 1 =
strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree.
Table 4: Responses Regarding General Beliefs
Rank
1
2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9

Fulbrighters
Mean
I have extensive connections
3.62
with the United States
I follow news about U.S.
foreign policy on a regular
3.69
basis
I am socially active and hold
3.77
several leadership positions
I have always associated my
long-term future with
3.88
Estonia
International public opinion
significantly shapes
3.92
international affairs
Culture has an important role
4.27
to play in foreign affairs
I have always been interested
in international affairs
Issues like democracy and
personal freedoms are very
important for me
I enjoy travelling and
learning about other cultures

Rank
1
2
3
6

5
7

4.27

4

4.50

8

4.60

9

Control Group
Mean
I have extensive connections
2.39
with the United States
I follow news about U.S.
foreign policy on a regular
3.02
basis
I am socially active and hold
3.50
several leadership positions
I have always associated my
long-term future with
4.15
Estonia
International public opinion
significantly shapes
3.93
international affairs
Culture has an important
4.30
role to play in foreign affairs
I have always been
interested in international
3.80
affairs
Issues like democracy and
personal freedoms are very
4.46
important for me
I enjoy travelling and
4.56
learning about other cultures

As Table 4 shows, the statement that produced the greatest contrast was the one regarding
extensive connections with the U.S. In comparison with the control group, Fulbrighters were less
likely to consider their connections with the U.S. limited. Fulbrighters were more likely than
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members of the control group to regularly follow news about U.S. foreign policy, be interested in
international affairs, and consider themselves socially active. In connection with this, members
of the control group were more likely than Fulbrighters to agree with the statement that they had
always associated their long-term future with Estonia, perhaps revealing somewhat lower levels
of global attitude. Interestingly, the control group was more likely than the Fulbrighters to
consider the role of culture in international affairs important. Most of the Fulbrighters had had
connections with the U.S. even aside from their Fulbright exchange, and their responses ranged
from attending conferences and seminars, business and personal contacts from travelling. About
half of the members of the control group had been to the U.S. as tourists; several people
mentioned relatives and friends and American exchange students in Estonia whom they had met
at their universities.
In conclusion on the section of general beliefs, it appears that in comparison with the
control group, Fulbrighters demonstrated higher levels of interest in foreign affairs, higher levels
of global-mindedness. The specific reasons for this are difficult to pinpoint, but these findings
are in line with theoretical literature that associates experiences of living or studying abroad and
being in a close contact with people of different nationalities with growing self-awareness and
curiosity.
America’s Role in the World and U.S.-Estonian Bilateral Relationship
The aim of the second set of questions was to identify the opinions of Fulbrighters and of
the control group about the United States, its role in the world, and the nature of the relationship
between the U.S. and Estonia, and the Estonian and American people.
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Table 5: Responses Regarding the U.S. and its Role in the World
Rank
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Fulbrighters
The U.S. provides an
excellent example of
democracy for the world
The U.S. has a great deal to
gain from partnering with
Estonia
I personally know several
Estonians who are highly
skeptical of the United
States and its role in the
world
The U.S is culturally
dominant in the world
The U.S. is successful in
engaging with people from
different countries and
cultures
The U.S. is overextending
its military power in the
world
NATO (and American)
military power is central to
global security
U.S.-Estonian relationship
is, first and foremost,
founded on shared values
In general, the Estonian
people see Americans
favorably
Culturally, Estonia has
always belonged to the West
(Western Europe, the U.S.)
Estonia has a great deal to
gain from partnering with
the U.S.

Mean
3.09

Rank
4

3.32

3

3.39

2

3.43

6

3.52

7

3.65

1

3.88

9

3.91

8

3.96

10

4.17

5

4.26

11

Control Group
Mean
The U.S. provides an
excellent example of
3.36
democracy for the world
The U.S. has a great deal to
gain from partnering with
3.36
Estonia
I personally know several
Estonians who are highly
skeptical of the United
3.32
States and its role in the
world
The U.S. is culturally
3.64
dominant in the world
The U.S. is successful in
engaging with people from
3.70
different countries and
cultures
The U.S. is overextending
its military power in the
3.24
world
NATO (and American)
military power is central to
3.94
global security
U.S.-Estonian relationship
is, first and foremost,
3.90
founded on shared values
In general, the Estonian
people see Americans
3.98
favorably
Culturally, Estonia has
always belonged to the West 3.56
(Western Europe, the U.S.)
Estonia has a great deal to
gain from partnering with
4.22
the U.S.

As Table 5 suggests, regarding this set of questions, the differences between the two groups were
more significant. Somewhat surprisingly, the biggest number of Fulbrighters disagreed with the
statement that “The U.S. provides an excellent example of democracy to the world”. While the
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average or mean percentage is helpful in understanding the general tendencies, this question is
worth exploring more closely. Figure 2 shows the exact responses to the question and reveals
that the answers of the both groups varied considerably.
Figure 2: "The U.S. provides an excellent example of a democracy to the world"
100%
90%
80%
70%
Strongly Agree

60%

Agree

50%

Neither Agree Nor Disagree

40%

Disagree

30%

Strongly Disagree

20%
10%
0%
Fulbright Participants

Control Group

While a significant portion of responders was unsure about the statement in Figure 3, more than
30 percent of Fulbrighters disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. As the same time,
more than 35 percent of Fulbrighters agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, demonstrating
that it is very difficult to find any patterns in Fulbrighters’ responses to this question.
When it came to questions about the United States, in many cases, the responses of Fulbrighters
showed higher levels of skepticism than those of the control group. For instance, Fulbrighters
were more likely to claim that the U.S. overextends its military power in the world, that they
knew Estonians who were highly skeptical of the U.S., and that the U.S. in unsuccessful in
engaging with people from different countries and cultures.
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As Table 5 demonstrates, the overwhelming sentiment of Estonians towards the U.S. is
positive, and this was confirmed in an open-ended question that asked the responders to name
some of the basic values that they thought the U.S. stood for. The responses of the two groups
were converted into word clouds where the frequency of the response is correlated with its size
in the figure.
Figure 3: "In your mind, what are some of the basic values the United States stands for?"
Most popular responses from Fulbright participants.

Figure 4 outlines the most frequent responses of the control group to allow for comparison
between both groups. Because the overall volume of responses of the control group was greater,
less frequent responses appear smaller.
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Figure 4: "In your mind, what are some of the basic values that the United States stands
for?" Most popular responses from the control group

Freedom and freedom of speech were the two terms most frequently used by both groups.
However, it is interesting to see that democracy, overwhelmingly the most frequent response for
the control group, was much less present in the responses of Fulbrighters. There reason for this
could be explained by the high expectations that many Fulbrighters have for the U.S. prior to
temporarily living in the country . As it appeared in the surveys, several people were negatively
surprised to see that in some fields, the U.S. failed to live up to these expectations and its
established values. While patriotism was often mentioned by Fulbrighters, none of the members
of the control group considered this a basic value that the U.S. stood for.
Figures 4 and 5 are representative of the positive responses, but a few people in both groups
expressed their opinion in a negative way. For instance, one of the Fulbrighters responded to the
question about the values that the United States stands for by saying,
Used to be free speech and democracy
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Another Fulbrighter suggested that there was a gap between articulated values on the public
discourses and what his experience suggested. With regards to the control group, an interesting
trend was emerged. While nearly everyone associated the U.S. with positive values like freedom
and democracy, several people voiced their hesitance or outright skepticism regarding the ability
of the U.S. to live up to these values. For instance,
The values of the US are hypocritical - it says it stands for freedom, but in reality the
people have none - if someone says or does anything that another person does not like,
they go to court. This is strictly limiting the freedom of speech.
Another member of the control group claimed,
[the U.S.] Wants to project itself as a defender of democracy and freedoms. However, it
seems like it stands more for the business interests of big corporations.
A response indicative of general support, but a certain level of hesitancy that several other people
showed, was,
I still hope they stand for freedom of speech and the right to privacy.
As mentioned earlier, Fulbrighters were considerably more likely to think that Estonia had
always belonged to the West, though both of the groups tended to agree that the American and
Estonian people shared the same values. When faced with a question about what some of the
differences between the American and Estonian cultures are, a majority of the responders
referred to the fact that Estonians tend to be more introverted and nature-oriented, while
Americans are very social, have a more individualistic mindset, and are more motivated to work.
The most typical responses among Fulbrighters was,
We do share the same values, but Americans are outspoken about them and say so.
Estonians are more shy about showing how much these values mean to them and The
core values have strong links, both nations value personal freedom and democracy, are
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patriotic. Estonian society is currently less open to multiculturalism. I would also say
that consumer practices differ due to economic opportunities, but this has made it
possible for Estonians to be more sustainable in their consumer behaviour, more
connected to nature and critical about the choices they make.
An outlier among the responses by the Fulbrighters was,
No, I don't think they share a lot of the same values. In the US is all about the career and
money and not necessarily the quality of life (long vacations and such). On the other
hand Estonians have a lot less motivation do work and excel at something. Also the US
has very little regard to the environment and social liberties.
The members of the control group were more likely to make reference to the differences between
the U.S. and Estonia regarding their posture and general role in the world. For instance, one
member of the control group argued,
The biggest difference is the size and economical and sociological impact in the world.
One can’t really compare the uncomparable.
There were also some references to the dominance of American popular culture and its influence
on Estonians. One member of the control group claimed,
In my opinion Estonian and American people are pretty same, we share the same values
and stand for the same values. Estonian teenager wannabe like a American teenager,
listening American pop music and wear American fashion.
Given that President Obama’s visit to Estonia in September 2014 got unprecedented media
attention and added considerable symbolism to U.S.-Estonian bilateral relations, both groups
were asked “What, if anything, comes to your mind when you think about President Obama's
speech in Tallinn in September 2014?” The significance of the event is confirmed by the fact that
only four people among 26 Fulbrighters and six among 54 members of the control group could
not recall the speech. The overwhelming majority saw the speech in a very positive light, and
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emphasized the significance of U.S. security guarantees for Estonia. Many mentioned NATO
Article 5. One Fulbrighter wrote,
Like many Estonians, I was impressed by the strength and unambiguity of Obama's
message, especially the part when the president said Estonia will not be left alone again.
Another category of responses emphasized the style and symbolism, rather than the substance of
the speech. As a member of the control group argued,
Nice gesture to thank a small ally for (marginal) military support. Obama is a skilled
orator and cited Marie Under.
And a Fulbrighter echoed these words by saying,
Carefully designed and excellently performed.
Some responses from the control group were more ambiguous, one Estonian saw this merely as
Estonia’s chance to “be famous for 15 minutes” and other claimed,
Very "big" words, whether they correspond to possible actions is yet to be seen. The
speech was simply nice, American to me.
An example of a rather skeptical and perhaps overly political account of a Fulbrighter was,
A promise to protect Western values in Estonia and if needed, also by force. However, I
do not know what was behind that promise. Maybe a promise by the President of Estonia
that the controversial Law on Cohabitation, which most Estonians are opposed to, will be
endorsed by the Estonian Parliament?
Despite some differences, there was a general understanding that Estonia had a great deal to gain
from partnering with the U.S., as the majority of people either agreed or agreed strongly and a
few remained neutral, though no one argued the opposite.
To summarize the responses in section on U.S.-Estonian bilateral relationship and U.S.’
role in the world, Fulbrighters were more critical than members of the control group about
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several features of the American society and particularly U.S. foreign policy undertakings. The
overwhelming sentiment, however, was positive for members of both groups, and the negative
comments seemed to have less to do with America’s unattractiveness compared to other
countries, for Estonians, than it was an indication of the high expectations that Estonians had for
the U.S. At least in part, this could be explained by the Cold War experience during which
Estonians looked up to the U.S. and other Western countries, and given the detestation for the
communist regime, many idealized the life in the free and democratic countries.
Exchange Programs and Governments’ Role in Cultural Relations
The difference between the questions that were asked from the two groups was the
biggest in the third set of questions. While Fulbrighters were asked to elaborate on their specific
experiences, the questions for the control group were more general and asked about their
thoughts about U.S. government-sponsored exchange programs. As Table 6 shows, the third set
of Likert-scale questions for Fulbrighters encouraged them to think back to their exchange
experience and reflect on the impact the program had on them.
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Note: The table outlines the mean of their responses to the following statements, where 1 =
strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree.
Table 6: Responses of Fulbrighters Regarding Exchange Programs
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

In general, I am likely to alter my beliefs and values
My assumptions about the U.S. and American people had been
mostly wrong
It is likely that my opinion about the U.S. will change (again) at
some point in the future
My exchange experience made me see the U.S. in a much more
positive light
The U.S. government should do more to engage with people
around the world
I personally want to do something to contribute to an even stronger
U.S.-Estonian relationship
I am still in connection with several Americans I met through the
Fulbright Program

Mean
2.45
2.59
2.64
3.55
3.59
4.00
4.55

While in the first two sets of questions Fulbrighters overwhelmingly agreed that they we eager to
learn about other cultures and took interest in U.S. foreign policy, the third block of questions
provided a solid affirmation that they did not consider themselves to be likely to alter their
beliefs and values. Depending on the expected outcome of the exchange programs, this can be
seen as an important indicator that makes it harder to expect tangible and quick benefits from the
programs. When Fulbrighters were asked to elaborate on whether or not their exchange
experience had an impact on their belief system, the responses differed markedly. One
Fulbrighter argued,
No; but now I love and value US even more.
And another one made a similar argument, but for entirely different reasons,
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I was exposed to the negative effects of all the values that USA is trying to implement at
home and abroad. My basic values did not change too much, despite being abroad.
Another Fulbrighter claimed his experience made her think about her identity in a different way,
arguing,
I became more sensitive towards social inequality and more aware of my duties as a
citizen and The experience made me appreciate more my own roots and where I come
from, it grew my sense of belonging. I discovered that many Americans have roots
elsewhere than in America but they are detached from their original families and cultures
and thus have lost part of their identity.
In the third section, the overwhelming sense of positivity about the U.S. was less noticeable than
it was in the second set of questions that had more to do with the U.S.-Estonian bilateral
relationship rather than the specific memories from the exchange experience. For instance, as
Figure 5 shows, in an open-ended question about the most surprising aspects of American way of
life, besides religiosity and openness, negative experiences with racial tensions and healthcare
appeared most frequently.
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Figure 5: "What were the most surprising aspects of the U.S. and the American way of
life?"

In the last section of the survey, both Fulbrighters and the control group were asked about
their opinions regarding the proper role of governments in cultural affairs. The responses from
Fulbrighters and the control group mirrored each other, with both groups arguing for a minimal
role of government in culture. As one Fulbrighter put it,
No, governments should stay out of shaping culture. The less the do the better.
Another Fulbrighter added to this,
No, they should not try to influence and shape other cultures, but they should instead
honor differences. This is occasionally a problem with U.S. programs abroad that they
seem to be enforcing U.S. culture and lifestyle rather than basic Western values.
Considering that the Fulbright Program itself is an indirect way in which governments have a
role in cultural affairs, calls for a complete termination of governments’ actions in the cultural
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arena are somewhat tricky, and many responders saw this more broadly. In elaborating on
governments’ rights to be involved in cultural affairs and shape other cultures, one Fulbrighter
argued,
I cannot imagine, how they cannot do this. Every contact with a different culture changes
the other culture.
Most responders were more specific about what the role of a government in cultural relations
ought to be. A member of the control group argued,
I think governments should support interaction between people so that they can learn
about other cultures. They should attempt to initiate cultural exchange, because that can
create a lot of growth in their own countries. They should attempt to influence and shape
cultures as far as to promote safety and wellbeing (i.e. fund campaigns against domestic
violence etc)
The questions in which Fulbrighters were the most uniform had to do with the contacts they
made during their exchange and their motivation to be more active. All of them either strongly
agreed or agreed with the statement that they are still in connection with several Americans they
met through the exchange program. A great majority said the experience made them more active
and they were happy to talk about their Fulbright experience. One Fulbrighter claimed,
Absolutely, I will try to share this experience with as many people as I can. A lot of my
friends are following my blog that I am keeping here. Everybody is interested to hear how
things are going here and I have always been relatively active :) However, I have become
a part of the community of Fulbrighters, who annually meet at the Residence of the US
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Ambassador to Estonia. Moreover, based on the acquaintances I have made when
attending these events, I have been invited to some other important events […]
In their closing statements, many indicated it changed their lives, and expressed gratitude
towards the U.S. government for the experience and personally wanted to do something to give
back and contribute to an ever stronger U.S.-Estonian relationship.
In conclusion of the findings from the original survey data, it appears that while
participating in U.S. government-sponsored exchange programs considerably changed the way
Estonian Fulbrighters saw the world and their role in being informed about international affairs,
the experience did not translate into greater support of U.S. foreign policy undertakings. In fact,
in many cases, the effect was the reverse, and Estonians who had not taken part in the exchange
programs were more positive about the U.S. and the way it engages with the world. However, it
is important to realize that the overwhelming sentiment expressed by Estonians from both groups
was positive. To some extent, an explanation for this lies in the nature of the bilateral
relationship and the importance of the U.S. in guaranteeing Estonia’s security, and in places in
world in which there are major differences with regard to foreign policy options in the region and
glitches in the bilateral relationship, the responses of the individual exchangees can be expected
to reflect somewhat different emotions.
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Chapter 6: Analysis and Policy Relevance of the Estonian Case Study
The results of the Estonian case study reveal that in most cases, getting a direct political
benefit from an exchange program is an unrealistic goal. While the results demonstrate that
Fulbrighters are more likely to be active in their communities, enjoy travelling, and have more of
a global outlook to the world, in several questions regarding the favorability of the United States
and its role in the world, Fulbrighters were more skeptical than the members of the control group.
Considerable criticism of the U.S. and its role in the world is all the more surprising given that
the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Estonia is most often marked by the word
“excellent”. Foreign policy goals of the governments of the U.S. and Estonia in the region where
Estonia is located align perfectly, and are widely supported by the Estonian people. This raises
several questions about U.S. public diplomacy efforts and realistic goals in regions where the
policy preferences of the U.S. and the local population not only do not align, but are
diametrically opposed.
Based on the Estonian study, four key lessons emerge:


Cultural differences are pervasive and profound



For the United States, getting its house in order is more important than ever



The U.S. government has a crucial role as an initiator – as opposed to participant – in the
exchanges



The global networks initiated by exchange programs have value in and of themselves
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Cultural differences are pervasive and profound
The results of the Estonian case study point to the fact that lumping the world together in
regions – such as what has become to be known as the West – and expecting uniformity and
monolithic audiences is unrealistic. Even in the context where policy preferences largely align
and any two countries enjoy excellent relations, cultural and historical traditions make the task of
public diplomacy difficult. The U.S. and Estonia share many of the same values, but instead of
constantly claiming their universality, it is better to reiterate, based on U.S. National Security
Strategy of 2010, that “different cultures and traditions give life to these values in distinct ways”
(The White House 2010, 36). While the Estonian case study raises fundamental questions about
the West and the homogeneity of its historical and cultural traditions, it also confirms that
understanding different cultures can bind people together. A great example of this is President
Obama’s carefully crafted speech in Tallinn, which reflected deep knowledge about Estonian
history, culture, and way of life, and received overwhelmingly positive reception. To be sure, it
is much easier for any U.S. President to win the hearts and minds of Estonians than it is to
persuade audiences with widely divergent cultural backgrounds in places like Iraq or Pakistan. In
these regions, opposition to the U.S. driven by substantial differences in specific policy questions
as well as different cultural norms is often so ingrained and irrational that soft power is almost
impossible to exercise. For this reason, understanding local culture and conditions is of
paramount importance for U.S. public diplomacy, and there cannot be any illusions regarding
these differences. Finally, as technology provides new outlets for U.S. public diplomacy and
opportunities to engage with people around the world, it is important to understand that
technology is thoroughly cultural, for any communication is linked to terms like sharing,
association, and possession of common faith (Carey 2009, 15).
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For the U.S., getting its house in order is more important than ever
Joseph Nye argues that while America benefits from being associated with values like
freedom, democracy, and human rights, Americans may also find themselves constrained to live
up to these values if the U.S. desires to remain attractive (2010, 217). President Obama’s
National Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of increasing America’s credibility by
“aligning our actions with our words” (The White House 2010), but this remains a major hurdle.
Many people around the world admire American values and ideals, but as Slaughter puts it,
“insist on measuring us by our performance” (2007, xvi). The Estonian case study gave evidence
of the high expectations that people around the world have for the United States. Several of them
were disillusioned by seeing first-hand that life in America – whether in terms of civil liberties or
opportunity of equality – did not coincide with the imagination of the U.S. as a beacon of hope
and freedom. Popular media often adds to the simplistic and idealized view of the U.S.
President Obama is right that America’s “moral leadership is grounded principally on the
power of our example” (The White House 2010) and when the U.S. is inviting foreign students
to their country, they need to make sure not to produce negative images. Slaughter, Lord and
others call for inward-looking, arguing that American citizens, as well as government should be
willing to do more to “make democracy work” and to understand the world better (2007, 15;
Lord 2008, 38). The importance of domestic citizens as strategic publics for U.S. public
diplomacy is particularly apparent given that communication of parties tend to “mirror their
perceptions of each other” and many argue that for this reason, the U.S. will have to listen as
much as it talks to regain its moral balance (Zaharna 2010, 179; Fitzpatrick 2011, 39; Peterson et
al. 2003, 10). Perfection is not a realistic standard to hold any individual or country up to, but the
U.S. would benefit from inward-looking and frank discussion of its drawbacks to demonstrate its
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humility and commitment to improve. A great example of this sense of humility and humor
comes from September 2014 when President Obama was on his visit to Estonia, and made
international headlines by praising the minuscule and internationally marginal Estonia for its egovernment solutions and saying “I should have called the Estonians when we were setting up
our healthcare website” (The White House 2014c).
The U.S. government has a crucial role as an initiator – as opposed to participant – in the
exchanges
The results of the Estonian case study provide a strong basis to suggest that the role of the
U.S. government in initiating these exchanges is crucial. Given the high cost of U.S. higher
education, several Fulbrighters maintained that receiving the grant made the U.S. experience
possible and that they will always be grateful for U.S. government’s investment in them. Besides
creating opportunities for personal enrichment, by sponsoring exchange the U.S. government
sends a broader message that it understands the value of exchange of ideas and resources and
cares about what people around the world think about America.
At the same time, both Estonian Fulbrighters and non-Fulbrighters were overwhelmingly
opposed the role of U.S. government in supervising and managing their exchanges and
transnational people-to-people communications more broadly. Based on their accounts, the
attempt of governments to intervene greatly undermines the authenticity and value of these
communications. Any attempt to directly politicize the exchanges would defeat their purpose.
The U.S. has nothing to win from inviting over oblivious people and indoctrinating them into
believing a message set by the U.S. government. Its ability to create personal development and
genuine dialogue and embody the belief in freedom of thought and freedom of speech is a key
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strength of the Fulbright Program. Here, the Estonian case study can once again serve as a good
example of how this cannot be taken for granted.
The expansion of global network is a value in itself
The Estonian case is a good example of the value and importance of people-to-people
contacts, particularly with regard to how active Estonian expatriate communities and networks
contributed to Estonia’s regaining of independence in early 1990s. There is nothing
fundamentally new about networks, but many argue that the intensity has grown, and that the
international environment is defined by networks of interconnected communities and interests
(Fitzpatrick 2011, 37). In analyzing the impact of exchange programs, Scott-Smith argues
“Instead of asking what these results actually result in (in other words, as a form of measurable
power), it is better to recognize […] that the networks created are themselves a form of power”
(2012, 23). The results of the Estonian case study back up this claim, with all 26 Fulbrighters
either strongly agreeing or agreeing with the statement that they are still in connection with
several Americans they met through the Fulbright Program.
The U.S. government has a direct stake in this – for in the modern world, “Groups and
individuals have been empowered, and hierarchy, centralization, and control are being
undermined. Power is shifting away from nation-states, up, down, and sideways” (Zakaria 2011,
5). Many argue that those with the capacity to build the most extensive and strongest
communication networks will command power in the modern era (Lord 2008, 11). Zaharna
suggests that America could gain the “cooperative advantage” in international affairs by better
cultivating network communication and relational strategies; making it clear that building on the
network the exchanges help to create must be a key priority for U.S. public diplomacy (Zaharna
2010, 173).
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Policy Relevance and Using the Estonian Case Study as a Model
The significance of the results of the Estonian case study lies in its confirmation that
cultural differences must be taken seriously and treating large geographical regions as a
monolithic block is much too simplistic. These realities must be particularly seriously considered
when U.S. public diplomacy sets itself to expand to new geographic regions and new audiences,
often ones that are due to historical and cultural reasons are much more skeptical of the U.S. and
its role in the world than countries anywhere in Europe. While using the results of the Estonian
study as a template for America’s engagement in Central and Eastern Europe is appealing, this
thesis argues that it could be done in an instructive fashion, while taking into account the specific
conditions and cultural and historical predilections of the target country.
The following policy suggestions are based on a combination of the theoretical literature
and the part of original survey data in which the two groups of Estonians were asked to explain
their understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. public diplomacy. In terms of the
organizational side of U.S. public diplomacy, the recommendations of this study are in line with
several reports (Lord 2008; Peterson et al. 2003) that call for increasing partnerships between the
Department of State and independent organizations and actors to ensure the authenticity and
legitimacy of the exchanges and transnational communication is a situation where skepticism
towards the role of U.S. government is significant.
Policy Suggestions: In its engagement with Estonia, the U.S. government ought to:



Increase the availability of U.S. government-sponsored exchange programs

If anything, the digital age has increased the need for exchange programs and long-term peopleto-people contact. The availability of Fulbright grants in Estonia needs to increase, especially in
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a context of proliferation of exchange programs funded by the European Union and other
European countries. Despite the general appeal of U.S. higher education system, very high costs
and overly complicated bureaucracy deny many Estonians from even considering applying to
American institutions.


Use internet platforms as a an “exchange multiplier”

U.S. public diplomacy makers should constantly adjust to new technology, as it has by moving
from radio and satellite TV as the main channels of information to different internet platforms.
Social media should be more habitually used to help participants of U.S. government-sponsored
exchanges, but also other Estonians who have been to the U.S. to do business or study, to share
their experience and thereby broaden the understanding of the United State in their home
countries. Many Estonian Fulbrighters who participated in this study provided very long and
thoughtful responses and would most likely be happy to see the U.S. Embassy in Tallinn
contacting them for a short interview.


Provide more nuanced – rather than just more – information about the U.S.

In any U.S. public diplomacy efforts, it is of paramount importance to ensure that chosen
methods of engagement and communications reflect a nuanced understanding of the norms, ways
of communication, and opinions of the host country. The idea of U.S. government-sponsored
American Spaces and American Corners as places where people can find information about the
U.S. and watch American movies is attractive, but fits much to a society where the knowledge
about the U.S. and the availability of information – especially with regard to internet freedom –
is limited. Almost any kind of online content is available for Estonians, and its history has made
it almost inevitable for its people to have at least general knowledge about the world outside of
Estonia’s borders. What Estonians are lacking is a more nuanced understanding of the U.S., the
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American way of life, and U.S. foreign policy outside of their home region and U.S. relations
with Russia.


Research the impact of U.S. public diplomacy programs in Estonia

This thesis argues that the specific impact of U.S. public diplomacy initiatives, particularly
exchanges, is very difficult to determine and should not be seen as a determinant whether or not
investing in the programs is justified. However, it does call for greater efforts to reach out to
Estonians through polling and other means to be able to understand their needs and opinions.


Better involve independent organizations and individuals in U.S. public diplomacy
efforts

Estonian Fulbright alumni are the best example of an underutilized human resource for U.S.
public diplomacy efforts in the country. More than two thirds of the responders were very
grateful for the experience and claimed they personally wanted to do something to contribute to
an even stronger U.S.-Estonian relationship, and the Embassy must do a better job providing
them with opportunities to do so.


Target non-STEM students for the Fulbright Program

Although the scope of the Fulbright Program is broad and it accepts students and scholars from
fields as different as physics and poetry, the lack of social scientists stood out among program’s
Estonian participants from 2009-2014. This tendency is apparent in many other competitive
programs, where STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) students seem to be at a
relative advantage for their work is often more readily measurable and transferable into tangible
results. This does not undermine the value of liberal arts education, and while working for the
government or becoming a foreign policy professional by no means presupposes a degree in
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International Relations or Political Science, the Fulbright Program as the most prestigious of the
U.S. government-sponsored exchange programs would benefit from attracting more social
scientists and potential future political leaders.
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Conclusion
The increasing value of soft power, the belief that a country can achieve what it wants in
world politics by the power of attraction, is an indication of the transformation of traditional
power structures and the new realities of the diverse and interconnected world. Public diplomacy
in its various forms has the potential to build country’s credibility and legitimacy, assets that are
particularly important for the United States, a county that has an impressive set of foreign policy
interests and obligations around the globe. The kind of foreign policy that best advances
America’s goals must take the legitimate concerns of others into account. Creating understanding
and trust is crucial for foreign policy, as Peterson et al. argue: “Taking foreign opinion into
account does not mean forsaking U.S. interests, let alone its values. But is it naïve not to realize
that attitudes abroad can obstruct the success of U.S. foreign policies” (2003, 4).
In foreign policy, actions speak louder than words, but the style still matters, and context
– the moment of time, the communicator, target audience, and the conditions of their interaction
– are critical to public diplomacy (Cowan and Arsenault 2008, 12). The mistakes made during
the Bush administration showed the costs of getting communication and public diplomacy wrong,
but with its explicit attention to creating meaningful human interactions, the Obama
administration has managed to offset some of these losses. At the same time, public diplomacy
must be approached with a dose of sober realism: it is not a magic bullet and the United States,
especially given its power and cultural influence, will never be universally loved. Given the
realities of the complex and interconnected world, it is increasingly apparent that it would be a
mistake to try.
The U.S. should make sure to show its willingness to engage even with those who feel
outright hatred towards the country, but also commit itself to strengthening its ties with its
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closest friends and allies by encouraging people-to-people contact and creating lifelong
relationships. The exchange programs hold a lot of potential to benefit not only the participants,
but generate ripple effects of mutual understanding. At the same time, the government’s role in
exchanges should be limited to initiation and support, and the interchanges, as Scott-Smith
argues, “can only succeed if they are given the free space to function without any set agenda
behind them” (2011, 9). People understand each other through culture, and culture is an essential
way of creating dialogue. It is particularly important in the global communication era, for new
technological solutions provide opportunities for understanding as well as misunderstanding.
Increasingly, good listening is at least as important as persuasive talking, and this is the starting
point of any effective public diplomacy.
In an information age, power has become less hierarchical and networks, organizations
and individuals are increasingly influential in influencing nation-states. As Nye argues, today
more than ever, the United States, with all its military might and economic prowess, needs the
support of other countries and people around the world (2004; 2010). Many of the challenges to
the U.S. and the world today are global, and as Slaughter argues, it is likely that the solutions
will be, too (2010). The world, strongly impacted by terrorist networks, rise of violent extremism
and xenophobia, needs people who accept the uniqueness of others, can work with people around
the world, and are open to the possibility of change. Exchanges are not the magic answer to U.S.
foreign policy or the world’s problems, but they can, through their potential to create genuine
dialogue, increase mutual understanding and create global networks, bring people closer to each
other. For the United States, as Sun Tzu would suggest, this would bring more perfect battles –
that is, those that do not have to be fought.
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Appendix 1: Online Survey for Estonian Fulbright Students and Scholars
Q1 Informed Consent Form: Bucknell University
Project Name: “Soft Power and Cultural Exchange: The Impact of U.S. Public Diplomacy on
the Beliefs of Estonians”
Purpose of the research: The purpose of this research is to examine the role and nature of
American soft power and study the impact of U.S. Public Diplomacy on the beliefs of Estonians.
More specifically, the research seeks to assess the effectiveness of U.S. government-sponsored
educational and cultural exchange programs and explain their value as foreign policy tools.
General plan of the research: I understand that I will be responding to a series questions about
my perceptions of the United States, its role in the world, and its interactions with Estonia. I also
understand that I will be asked to answer general questions regarding my demographic
information such as gender and age. I understand that the language of the questionnaire is
English, but I am allowed to give my responses either in English or in Estonian.
Estimated duration of the research: I understand that my participation in this study will take no
more than 30 minutes.
Estimated total number of participants: I understand that the research wishes to include at
least 30 students and scholars in this study.
Questions or concerns: I understand that if I have any questions or concerns related to this
study, I may contact the Principal Investigator, Kadri Lutter, via email at kl032@bucknell.edu. I
may also contact Professor David Mitchell, Chair, Department of International Relations at
Bucknell University, via email at dmmitche@bucknell.edu. For general questions regarding
human subject research or questions regarding ethical treatment and rights of human subjects, I
may contact Matthew Slater, Chair of the Institutional Review Board at Bucknell University, at
+1(570) 577-2767 or by email at mhs016@bucknell.edu.
Subject participation is voluntary: I understand that my participation in this study is completely
voluntary and that if I agree to participate I may change my mind at any time.
No compensation: I understand that my contribution to the current research is voluntary and I
will not be compensated for my participation.
Possible risks or discomforts: I understand that no risks or discomforts are anticipated from
taking part in this study. I also understand that if I feel uncomfortable with a question, I can skip
that question or withdraw from the study altogether. I also understand that information I disclose
for the purposes of this study will be secured and kept confidential. Possible benefits: I
understand that my participation in this study will contribute to the existing knowledge
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concerning Estonians’ perceptions of the United States and its role in the world, and the
effectiveness of cultural and educational exchange programs sponsored by the U.S. Department
of State. The study will also give valuable insight into how Estonians perceive the nature and
role of soft power in the bilateral relationship between the United States and Estonia.
Confidentiality: I understand that data acquired through this study will be kept confidential. I
also understand that all data collected will be secured and only made available to those persons
conducting the study. I understand that no reference will be made in any works that could
possibly link me to the study.
 By clicking below, I affirm I have read the above description and I agree to participate in this
research. (1)

Q2 Which gender do you identify with?
 Female (1)
 Male (2)
 Other (3)

Q3 Please identify your nationality
 Estonian (1)
 Russian (2)
 Other (3)

Q4 How old are you?






19-22 (1)
23-26 (2)
27-30 (3)
31-34 (4)
35+ (5)

Q5 What is your level of education?
 Bachelor's degree (1)
 Master's degree (or currently a candidate for Master's degree) (2)
 PhD (or currently a doctoral candidate) (3)
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Q6 Where (in what part of Estonia) did you grow up, go to school and university?

Q7 What field are you studying or working in?

Q8 Aside from your Fulbright exchange experience, what have been your connections with the
United States and the American people?

Q9 Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree (3)

Agree
(4)

Strongly
Agree
(5)

I have always been interested in
international affairs (1)











I have extensive connections with the
United States (2)











I follow news about U.S. foreign policy
on a regular basis (3)











Issues like democracy and personal
freedoms are very important for me (4)
Culture has an important role to play in
foreign affairs (6)





















International public opinion
significantly shapes international
affairs (7)











NATO (and American) military power
is central to global security (9)











I enjoy travelling and learning about
other cultures (10)











I am socially active and hold several
leadership positions (11)
I have always associated my long-term
future with Estonia (12)
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Q10 What is your general sense of the United States and its role in the world?

Q11 In your mind, what are some of the basic values that the United States stands for?

Q13 Do you think that the United States and Estonia, and the American and Estonian people, by
and large, share the same values? What are some of the differences between the two cultures?
Q14 What, if anything, comes to your mind when you think about President Obama's speech in
Tallinn in September 2014?
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Q15 Please indicate your opinion about the following statements regarding the United States,
Estonia, and the relationship between the two countries.
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree (3)

Agree
(4)

Strongly
Agree
(5)

In general, the Estonian people see
Americans favorably (1)











The U.S. provides an excellent
example of democracy for the
world (2)











U.S.-Estonian relationship is, first
and foremost, founded on shared
values (3)











Culturally, Estonia has always
belonged to the West (Western
Europe, the U.S.) (10)











The U.S is culturally dominant in
the world (4)











Estonia has a great deal to gain
from partnering with the U.S. (6)











The U.S. has a great deal to gain
from partnering with Estonia (7)











I personally know several Estonians
who are highly skeptical of the
United States and its role in the
world (8)











The U.S. is successful in engaging
with people from different countries
and cultures (5)











I have heard about EducationUSA
offices, American Spaces, and
American Corners in Estonia (9)











The U.S. is overextending its
military power in the world (11)































Many of U.S. foreign policy actions
serve merely their own national
interest (12)
I welcome American troops in
Estonia and support the efforts to
integrate them in the society (13)

112

Q16 Have you come across any programs or initiatives (such as social media and other outreach
campaigns) through which the United States tries to promote its values and ideals abroad? By
your judgement, what has been the impact of this?

Q17 Why did you decide to apply for the U.S. government-sponsored Fulbright Program? What
are the most important things you got out of the program?

Q18 What were the most surprising aspects of the U.S. and the American way of life?

Q19 Did your exchange experience make you reconsider some of your basic values? Did it make
you alter your conception of democracy, freedom, and prosperity?

Q20 Did your exchange experience inspire you to become more socially (and politically) active?
Do you enjoy talking about your U.S. experience and have your peers and colleagues been
interested in hearing about it?
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Q21 Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your
exchange experience.
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree (3)

Agree
(4)

Strongly
Agree
(5)





















I am still in connection with several
Americans I met through the
Fulbright Program (3)











My assumptions about the U.S. and
American people had been mostly
wrong (5)











It is likely that my opinion about the
U.S. will change (again) at some
point in the future (7)











In general, I am likely to alter my
beliefs and values (6)































My exchange experience made me
see the U.S. in a much more positive
light (1)
I personally want to do something to
contribute to an even stronger U.S.Estonian relationship (2)

The U.S. government should do more
to engage with people around the
world (9)
I support the two-year home
residency requirement after returning
from Fulbright program (10)

Q22 Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has said, "I can think of no more valuable asset
to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here." What
are your reactions to this statement?
Q23 What is the proper role of governments in cultural affairs? Should they attempt to influence
and shape other cultures?
Q24 Is there anything else that you would like to share about your exchange experience? Please
feel free to provide any additional comments or questions.
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Appendix 2: Online Survey for the Control Group
Up to Question 17, the surveys were almost identical.

Q17 Have you ever considered applying or applied for any U.S. government sponsored
educational or cultural exchange programs (such as the Fulbright Student and Fulbright Scholar
Programs)? Why or why not?

Q18 Have you talked to or heard about anyone who has taken part in U.S. government sponsored
exchange programs? If yes, have the accounts of their experiences broadened or altered your
understanding of America?

Q19 Have you had any study or work experiences abroad? Have they shaped your value system
and perception of the host country? In what ways?

Q20 Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has said, "I can think of no more valuable asset
to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here." What
are your reactions to this statement?

Q21 What is the proper role of governments in cultural affairs? Should they attempt to influence
and shape other cultures?

Q22 Please feel free to provide any additional comments or questions regarding any of the
covered topics.
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